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Synergy and Friction The CRA, BHCs, the SBA, and
Community Development Lending
By CASSANDRA JONES HAVARD*

1. INTRODUCTION
he assumption ofthe Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA'')l is
that if geographic disinvestment is illegal, federally insured
financial institutions wi11lend more funds in low- and moderateincome neighborhoods.2 Geographical disinvestment occurs when financial
institutions choose not to invest in certain geographical areas.3 The CRA

T

• Associate Professor, Temple University School ofLaw. B.A. Bennett College;
J.D. University of Pennsylvania. I am grateful for the thoughtful comments of my
colleagues Michael Libonati and Laura Little, the insights of Lamar Kendrick, Jack
Goldstein, and Peter Nigro, and the talent and skill of my research assistants,
AdeolaAdele and Charlotte Hunsbarger, and to Temple University Law School for
fmancial assistance.
I The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (1994).
2 See, e.g., S. REp. No. 95-175, at 33 (1977) ("[T]he Committee is aware of
amply documented cases of red-lining, in which local lenders export savings
despite sound local lending opportunities. Only recently, under the constraint of a
lawsuit by civil rights groups and two highly critical oversight reports by this
Committee, has the Federal Home Loan Bank Board begun to adopt an anti-red
lining program.").
3 When Congress enacted the legislation, most lenders were making loans
readily available in affluent or suburban areas while deteriorating inner cities had
substantially less access to such loans. See Griffith L. Garwood & Dolores S.
Smith, The Community ReinvestmentAct: Evolution and CurrentIssues, 1993 FED.
RESERVE BULL. 251, 251 (noting that Congress passed the CRA to ensure that
banks are providing appropriate levels of financing to communities and to promote
equality in lending, thus eliminating red-lining); A. Brooke Overby, The
Community Reinvestment Act Reconsidered, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1431, 1450-51
(1995) (distinguishing disinvestment from red-lining).
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requires that federally regulated fmancial institutions meet the credit needs
of their entire community.4
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act ("HMDA")S (a predecessor to the
CRA) and the CRA focused primarily on access to home mortgages.6 The
more recent Community Development Banking and Financial Institutions
Act ("CDBFIA"V expands the focus of the lending evaluation to place as
great an emphasis on personal and small business lending as on home
mortgages. 8 The underlying premise is that to be successful, economic
communities need an infrastructure of local businesses that create
economic activities and sustain business profits.9 Given that premise, a
4 Before the passage of the CRA, the absence of law requiring equal access to
credit pennitted the controversial practice of red-lining. Banks were therefore free
to deny credit in the very neighborhoods that made up their depositor base. See
infra text accompanying note 16.
5 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2811 (1994). The Act "requires banks and other depository
institutions to compile and make available to the public and supervisory authorities
infonnation about home mortgage and home improvement lending practices."

Activists Are Challenging Bank Expansion Much More Than CRA Peiformance,
16 BANKING POL'yREp. No.3, at 9 (Feb. 3, 1997).
6 "In 1992, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston released a detailed study of
whether financial institutions in Boston discriminated against individual home
mortgage loan applicants." Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial

Bias o/Federal Housing Law and Policy: ConcentratedPoverty in UrbanAmerica,
193 U. PA. L. REv. 1285, 1317 (1995). The authors used HMDA data and the
"records on individual loan applicants from mortgage originators." ld. The study
"found that being black or Hispanic was significantly related to having one's loan
application denied," with blacks and Hispanics "being 56% more likely than whites
to be rejected." ld. at 1317-18.
7 12 U.S.C. §§ 4701-4718 (1994) (also known as the Riegle Community
Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994).
8 Among the Act's refonns are the establishment of community development
fmancial institutions ("CDFIs"), which serve as alternative lenders for community
development projects. See 12 U.S.C. § 4702(5) (1994); infra text accompanying
note 66.
9 See Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Economic Em-

powerment: Structural Economic Theory, Procedural CivilRights, and Substantive
Racial Justice, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1463, 1468 (1994). Taibi argues that the
disparities in investment opportunities between low-income communities and other
communities is a result of racial, ethnic, or class biases. This disinvestment, he
argues, results in a "systematic market failure" that neither the "equality paradigm"
nor the "affinnative action paradigm" addresses effectively. ld. The fonner
approach is ineffective because it assumes that competition for resources is the
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continuous, successful community development program not only provides
equal access to credit, but also results in revitalized low- and moderateincome neighborhoods, small businesses, and farms. 10
The CDBFIA is flawed, however, to the extent that it does not take into
account the effect that geographical consolidation of the banking industry
will have on small business lending. The easing of geographic restrictions
in banking has resulted in fewer institutions. ll Arguably, the concomitant
effect on all business lending is a broader credit market and therefore

same regardless of the underlying socioeconomic circumstances. The latter
approach is ineffective because "[i]t never questions the structure of marketplaces
that routinely produce unacceptable results." Id.; see also Rochelle E. Lento,

Community Development Banking Strategy for Revitalizing Our Communities, 27
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 773, 775 (1994).
10 See Allen J. Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act After Fifteen Years:
It Works, But StrengthenedFederalEnforcement is Needed, 20 FORDHAMURB. L.J.
293 (1993) (stating that the premise of the CRA is that banks and savings
institutions have a charter obligation to meet the banking needs of their local
communities); see also Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending
Discrimination: A Law and Economics Analysis, 73 TEx. L. REv. 787, 842 (1995)
(arguing that because CRA compliance imposes such a heavy regulatory burden,
a "safe harbor" provision, which would allow a party to meet either a general
standard or a precise rule of compliance, would encourage financial institutions to
invest in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods by decreasing compliance
costs while increasing the amount of investment). But cf Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79
VA. L. REv. 291, 319-20 (1993) (arguing that CRA compliance is too costly,
making it economically rational for banks not to invest in areas with high-risk
returns).
11 SeeArthurE. Wilmarth,Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve? ThePotential
Risks of Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA L. REv. 957, 961 (1992) [hereinafter
Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail] (analyzing the nationalization trend and resulting
mergei-s); see also Activists Are Challenging BankExpansion on Much More Than
CRA Peiformance, supra note 5, at 7 (commenting that the new strategy employed
by community activists is to challenge applications for mergers and acquisitions
filed by bank holding companies on the basis that such mergers pose a threat to the
future of community lending). But cf John A. Buchman, Can Community Banks
Survive? What the Interstate Banking Act Will Mean, 5 Bus. L. TODAY 44, 44
(Jan./Feb. 1996) (positing that reports that bank mergers will lead to decrease in the
number of community banks are "greatly exaggerated").
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greater access to funds. 12 However, for small businesses generally, and the
community development business l3 in particular, this may not be the case.
Ensuring credit equality to this sector requires closer scrutiny of all
aspects of available small business lending. A two-pronged approach is
needed. First, the Small Business Administration ("SBA") must specifically recognize community development lending as a preferred goal of its
small business loan programs. This would encourage lenders to use the
funds for community development business loans, and to a limited extent,
discourage them from using the loans in a way that results in geographic
disinvestment. Second, a bank holding company should be required to
assume CRA responsibility for small business lending. The bank
subsidiary's parent company would then have to scrutinize its entire SBA
loan portfolio to review the availability of SBA-guaranteed loans in areas
where geographical disinvestment might occur. In this Article, I argue that
industry consolidation trends require transferring the locus of CRA
responsibility for small business lending from the bank subsidiary to the
bank holding company. Even though holding companies are closely
involved in the CRA performance oftheir bank subsidiaries, assessing their
involvement is crucial so that uniformity of lending in this highly
specialized, subjective area of lending may be ensured. Focusing on the
holding company also would modulate concerns about perceived riskiness
that might result in credit denial to worthy small business borrowers.
This Article begins by evaluating the CRA's policy objectives through
various legal perspectives. Part ill discusses the recent reform in CRA
regulations, reviewing the standards for evaluating a large retail bank's
obligations under the CRA and the changes designed to increase credit
access for small businesses. Part IV presents a critique of CDBFIA's
fmancing schemes. Part V lays the foundation for my proposal by
explaining the SBA's guaranteed loan programs and the CRA's impact
when a bank holding company prepares to expand. In Part VI, I propose
12 According to Taibi, successful "CRA reform both must reduce the
discretionary power of bureaucrats and promote community economic
empowerment." Taibi, supra note 9, at 1507; see also infra text accompanying note
24.
\3 The community development business, as used in this Article, refers to small
businesses located in economically distressed areas in need of sustained economic
revitalization and development. See also 12 C.F.R. § 228. 12(i) (1994) (defining a
community development loan under the CRA regulations as, among other things,
a loan used for activities that promote economic development by financing small
business).
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that the bank holding company or the parent company assume a limited but
defined role in promoting the use of federally guaranteed small business
lending. Specifically, the proposal requires that as a part of the merger
analysis, a holding company evaluate for each bank subsidiary the
geographic location ofits SBA-guaranteed loans, including those that have
been sold on the secondary market. This data will assist the Federal
Reserve Board ("Federal Reserve") in determining whether SBA-guaranteed lending results in geographic disinvestment. If this proposal is
adopted, the CRA might then become a more effective catalyst for
community economic development.

II. THE JURIDICAL CONTEXT OF
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT LENDING

It appears to be a complex task to discern whether race or neighborhood decline is the impetus for credit denial in low- and moderate-income
communities. According to many critics of the CRA, credit decisions are
dictated solely by objective indicators. That line of argument posits that
there ought to be a reasonable causal connection between credit imbalance
in a community and racial disparity in lending. This complex discernment
reveals a disjoinder of these two concepts - the need to recognize and
control the harm of discriminatory lending practices and the subtleness of
that discrimination. I4
This Article participates in the debate regarding the effectiveness ofthe
CRA by providing a concrete policy recommendation regarding the source
of funding for some CRA small business lending. As discussed below,
private lenders exercise much control over which borrowers receive these
funds, while the SBA's role is limited to acting as a guarantor of the
loans. IS Under the immediate proposal, the SBA's powers would include
ensuring that participating lenders have credit policies consistent with the
CRA's objective of discouraging lending decisions based upon the
geography ofthe loan.
14 See Vincent Di Lorenzo, Complexity and Legislative Signatures, Lending
Discrimination Laws as a Test Case, 12 J.L. & POL. 637, 662 (1996) (positing that

the ineffectiveness of the prohibitions found in the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
and the Fair Housing Act, combined with the ineffectiveness of the CRA, makes
stringent lending targets appear to be the only plausible way to remedy lending
discrimination).
IS See infra Parts VI and VII.
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A. Defining Geographical Disinvestment
The geographical disinvestment component of red-lining is the denial
of credit to an individual or business because of the location of the person
or property within an identified community. 16 When there is an inadequate
flow of capital into a community, loan availability to individuals or
businesses located in the neighborhood and neighborhood decline become
interrelated. This fusion makes evident the disparities in the credit-granting
processY
Another aspect of red-lining, discriminatory lending practices, has
traditionally focused on the behavior and attitudes oflenders toward people
who live in neighborhoods with declining or depressed property values.
This subtle distinction means in effect that the location of the property and
race become coefficients. IS The issue becomes not just whether the CRA
has been effective in ending neighborhood decline but also whether the
CRA can effectively address fair credit concerns, which focus on effects on
individuals rather than on communities. 19

16 See Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination: Economic Theory, Econometric Evidence, and the Community Reinvestment Act, 85
GEO. L.J. 237,237 (1996). Derming red-lining as geographic disinvestment focuses
on the lowering of a community's property values. Neighborhood decline is a
sequential occurrence. This depression in value eventually leads to the
community's depreciation through a cycle of decreased expenditures, decline in
property values, and abandonment.
17 See Lawrence J. White, The Community Reinvestment Act: Good Intentions
Headed in the Wrong Direction, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 281, 284-85 (1993)
(explaining that lending decisions often have a domino effect - denial by one lender
because of a reluctance to invest in the area results in denials by other lenders.)
18 See Willy E. Rice, Race, Gender, "Redlining, " and the Discriminatory
Access to Loans, Credit, and Insurance: An Historical and Empirical Analysis of
Consumers Who Sued Lenders and Insurers in Federal and State Courts, 19501995,33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 583,613 n.123 (1996).
19 Discriminatory lending practices take different forms. See JACK M.
GUTTENTAG & SUSAN M. WATCHER, REOLINING AND PUBLIC POLICY 11 (1980).
The most common are credit deniaJs based upon the geographical location of the
loan: lenders designate areas on city maps that are undesirable for bank loans. A
more subtle form of lending discrimination is a lender making a loan under less
favorable terms in one neighborhood than in another. Another example is a lender
declaring the value of a loan to be lower than the value of collateral. See id. at 7.
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B. Assessing the eRA: Three Schools olThought
The ineffectiveness of the eRA as a remedy to geographic disinvestment stems in great part from the statute's imprecise language. The statute
declares that regulated fmancial institutions have an obligation to meet the
credit needs of their communities.20 Although few disagree with the public
policy goals underlying the statute, eRA scholarship diverges into three
somewhat separate theories: economic empowerment, law and economics,
and discrimination. The economic empowerment theory evaluates the need
for lending based on socio-geographic factors. It views eRA lending as a
needed and deserved investment in a community that may have been long
neglected due to private and governmental fundingpriorities. 21 The law and
economics model posits that the eRA is obtrusive to the lending process
to the extent that it results in a bureaucratic ordering of the private
marketplace.22 Its premise is that the unmet credit needs of the community
are due to lenders' ability to determine that these particular loans would be
inefficient or risky performers. Discrimination theory views eRA
performance as an offshoot of fair lending laws.23 Based on a disparate
impact test, it finds the absence oflending to low- and moderate-income
communities actionable.
The brief discussion of each theory below highlights their most valid
reactions to the eRA. The purpose of the discussion is not to provide an
evaluation of anyone theory. Instead the discussion provides the framework in which to critique the unintended incongruence between the eRA
and the SBA. Equity may well demand adherence to the presumptions that
underlie both discrimination theory and economic empowerment theory,
and market theory properly recognizes the higher initial cost entailed in
20 As authors Hylton and Rougeau note, several operative terms are undefined
in the statute: "How should the regulators 'encourage' financial institutions to meet
'credit needs?' What exactly are 'credit needs?' How should 'local communities'
be defmed and when can a fmancial institution determine that lending in certain
communities is not 'consistent with safe and sound operation?'" Hylton &
Rougeau supra note 16, at 242.
21 For example, Taibi argues that "[w]orking toward real community empowerment must mean more than seeking more efficient and less alienating ways of
producing social services and economic development programs for lower-income
communities .... The financial system should be structured in such a way that local
economies are automatically strengthened, without the need for special programs."
Taibi, supra note 9, at 1520.
22 See infra text accompanying note 40.
23 See infra text accompanying note 63.
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this type of lending. However, as will be argued in Parts VI and VII,
focusing on the access of community development businesses to SBA loan
funds provides a concrete means of evaluating their credit access compared
to other small businesses using guaranteed loans for funding. This proposed
change to the existing SBA statutory scheme, along with a shift of the
responsibility for CRA small business loans to the holding company level,
should result in making lenders more open regarding access to these
federally guaranteed funds.

1. Economic Empowerment
Community groups have been successful in their attempts to oppose
bank expansion plans on the basis of the CRA.24 The statute's express
language requiring that financial institutions "help meet the credit needs of
the local communities,,25 is the basis for community groups' challenges,
both literal and figurative, to the entry of financial institutions into new
geographic markets or expansion within the bank's existing geographic
market.26 Community groups argue that the statute presumes that financial
institutions have an obligation to evaluate lending along socio-geographic
lines.27 Professor Anthony D. Taibi has advanced explicit legal theories
based on these previously abstract notions. He attacks the trend toward
industry consolidation as a move that will have tremendous socioeconomic
consequences for members of poorer communities.28 By viewing geographic disinvestment and community-based action as connected, he
concludes that the larger society is responsible for the harm to these
communities and must therefore assume this responsibility through a
strategy of reinvestment. 29
Taibi examines the structure of the financial system from the perspective of community empowerment. His arguments call for a change in
24 Although few applications have been denied based on such challenges,
community groups have used the CRA process to extract promises from banks,
both unilaterally and in anticipation of expansion approval from federal regulators.
See Taibi, supra note 9, at 1488.
2S 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (1994).
26 See infra Part V regarding the analysis of CRA performance under bank
merger laws.
27 The community empowerment theory is based in part on the idea of local
determination. See generally Overby, supra note 3.
28 See Taibi, supra note 9, at 1503.
29 See id. at 1505. Taibi criticizes the CRA to the extent that it does not impose
requirements on non-bank financial intermediaries.
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financial policy through the use of alternative financial institutions, e.g.,
community development banks, community development credit unions,
community development loan funds, and micro-loan funds. 30 He vehemently and skillfully presents the argument for federal intervention on the
issues affecting lending in low-income or marginalized communities.
Specifically, he argues that a federal approach can and must address these
problems and create new opportunities that address local, community-based
financial concerns.3!
By viewing wider societal forces as ultimately responsible for the
conditions of low- and moderate-income individuals, the community
empowerment approach seeks funding from outside .the community and
direction from within the community.32 Taibi theorizes that community
organizations involved in self-directed strategies are effective only if those
organizations can also address the structural causes of poverty and
unemployment.33
The community empowerment theory advocates a strong supply of
credit from financial institutions. That credit basically serves as a
"reinvestment" to satisfy the economic needs of the community.34 Taibi's
specific model questions the continued need for economic structures that
do not promote opportunities for economic development in low-income
communities.35 With control over local credit, community development financial institutions represent the economic structure that promotes "independence, local control, and freedom from bureaucratic red
tape.,,36

See id. at 1520-28.
Taibi calls for "fmancial institutions that are community specific in their
control, whether in the form of a broad-based community organization or simply
a local business elite focused on profits but informed by a sense of its cultural
roots." Id. at 1469.
32 To date few empirical studies exist that discuss the relationship between the
local depositor base and the local service area of specific banks. In 1992, the
Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now ("ACORN") prepared
a report based on publicly available deposit information and compared that base to
the institutions' lending patterns. See Overby, supra note 3, at 1493 n.294.
33 For example, Taibi argues that "[t]he larger issues of community empowerment lie in grappling with the structural forces that increasingly disempower local
communities." Taibi, supra note 9, at 1520.
34 See id.
35 See id. at 1519.
36Id. at 1522.
30

31
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The effect of the strategy is to correlate local lending to the deposit
base of the bank.37 This approach presumes that the desire for political selfdetermination will cause low- and moderate-income people to come
together across raciallines.38 Lack of access to credit will bridge differences among people and result in the shared economic goals and objectives
of empowerment. Yet, even if such a scheme is effective, it still leaves
undefmed, particularly for regulatory oversight purposes, how, other than
through lending, a community measures economic empowerment, and
therefore ultimately whether the lending has been successfuL39

2. Law and Economics
Many groups, including most banks, oppose the eRA because it
appears to be a bureaucratic reordering of the private marketplace. 40 To the
extent that the statute requires a nexus between local deposits and local
. lending, critics view it as credit allocation. Professors Macey and Miller
were among the earliest legal scholars advancing this view.41
37 Taibi challenges several presumptions of the current financial markets,
including the "objectivity" of credit standards to marginalized groups. See id. at
1514-17. The reinvestment of funds back into the community requires a
nontraditional method of assessing creditworthiness.
38 See id. at 1517.
39 Taibi's approach suggests evaluating eRA performance by a "determinative
requirement that institutions invest a set portion of [loan deposits] in approved
[community] investments." Id. at 1504. Overby argues that the new eRA
regulations that evaluate actual lending, investment, and service are similar to
Taibi's proposal. See Overby, supra note 3, at 1507-08.
40 See Macey & Miller, supra note 10, at 347 (arguing that the disadvantages
of the eRA outweigh its advantages); White, supra note 17, at 282 (offering an
economic perspective of the eRA and arguing that the statute is "fundamentally
flawed" because of its stringent requirements on depository institutions). But see
Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 16, at 287 (concluding that use of empirical
evidence oflending discrimination rather than an economic analysis, may be more
useful in monitoring compliance with the eRA and its goals).
41 In support of their main position that the disadvantages of the eRA outweigh
the advantages, Macey and Miller argue that credit should be directed to those who
value it most. They contend that "proponents of community reinvestment have
never satisfactorily explained why the mere fact that funds are obtained from a
particular locality ipso facto implies that these funds should be returned to the same
locality." Macey & Miller, supra note 10, at 308. Additionally, according to Macey
and Miller, since mutual funds now offer extensive checking privileges, they are
a great example of the competition between banks and other financial
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Macey and Miller oppose the CRA on several analytic bases, three of
which bear particular significance. First, they view as flawed the propositions that banks are local institutions and that bank deposit funds ought to
be recycled back into a community in the form of loans.42 Second, they
view the CRA as undercutting banks' abilities to effectively compete with
other fmancial intermediaries that do not have similar restrictions on
lending.43 Third, they argue that the inefficiency and monitoring costs of
CRA-type lending make it an unprofitable business venture for banks andmay therefore impact on institutions' safety and soundness.44
The economic analysis of the CRA focuses on the correlation between
information in the market and a price-based system.45 A perfect system
would allocate scarce credit efficiently because profit-maximizing
borrowers and creditors have perfect information. Borrowers would possess
knowledge about the sources of supply, appropriate pricing, and terms.
Creditors would possess knowledge about the demand for credit and the
creditworthiness of borrowers. Given such an accurate information base,
the market reacts rationally through these private borrowers and creditors,
who would likewise behave rationally. Ultimately, the market directs credit
to the highest users or those that value it highest through the pricing system
of interest rates.46
The economic model of CRA views the relationship between lenders
and the geographic location of the loans as indicative of the highest rate of
interest.that lenders can earn. The model does not integrate as a variable the
source ofthe funds used for loans. Rates and loan availability are indicative
solely of the sum of information about the borrower's creditworthiness.
Lenders making rational judgments based on a system of perfect information need not direct lending toward "local" communities, because the
intennediaries in trying to meet the banking needs of their local communities. The
effective monopoly held by depository institutions "has completely broken down
as banks and thrifts compete vigorously with one another for deposits . . . .
[D]epository institutions have lost an enonnously important government benefit
that they enjoyed at the time the CRA was enacted." Id. at 311.
42 See id. at 303-12.
43 See id. at 312-18.
44 See id. at 319-24.
45 See id. at 308.
46 See id. But see Michael Klauser, Market Failure and Community Investment:
A Market-Oriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L.
REv. 1561, 1566-68 (1995) (noting that infonnation imperfections in the markets
may result in lending discrimination in low-income neighborhoods).
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market makes an immediate adjustment to these needs through appropriate
interest rates to reflect the risk involved. 47
Under this theory of perfect information, the eRA's twinning of the
source of funds and local credit needs is unjustified.48 The price-based
system allocates scarce credit efficiently and directs credit to users that
value it through the pricing system of interest rates.49 Lenders grant credit
in areas where they can earn a higher rate of interest and the default rate is
lower, regardless of the source offunds.50 Thus, there is no nexus between
deposits and loans: A low loan-to-deposit ratio does not indicate disinvestment, but rather an efficient credit allocation system. 51
The pervasive low-income credit problem and a bank's responsibility
to allocate credit fairly do not therefore necessarily include service to
underserved groupS.52
The second specific objection to the eRA stems from it being
applicable to commercial banks but not other fmancial intermediaries.
While banks must comply with the eRA, fmancial intermediaries such as
pension funds, insurance companies, and mutual funds do not have the
same, or even a similar, obligation.
The expanding financial services market impairs banks' abilities to
continually attract depositors for their specific services, since a bank's
products are no longer unique. 53 To the extent that the eRA increases
compliance and monitoring costs, it decreases banks' competitiveness.54
See Macey & Miller, supra note 10, at 308.
See id. at 309.
49 See id. at 308-09.
50 See id.
51 See id. at 308 (''We would never insist that com grown in Iowa fann country
be returned to Iowa fanns. The com is shipped from the fanns, where it is in
surplus, to other areas where there is a deficit. It is not clear why credit should be
different. Like com or any other commodity, credit is allocated through a price
system that directs the good to the user who values it the most.").
52 Macey and Miller further argue that where credit is concerned, "the price is
the terms that the banker can obtain on loans; and if the banker can earn better
terms outside the local community than within, it is difficult to see why the law
should deter the transfer of the credit to the higher valued user." ld.
53 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, America's Banking System: the
Origins and Future of the Current Crisis, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 769, 770 (1991)
(discussing changes in financial intermediation).
54 See Robert c. Art, Social Responsibility in Bank Credit Decisions: The
Community Reinvestment Act One Decade Later, 18 PAC. L.J. 1071, 1075-85
(1986) (calling for a CRA obligation to be placed on all financial intermediaries).
47

48
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Macey and Miller argue against the notion that banks have a special
significance in the nation's monetary system. In fact, they argue that the
eRA is in effect a "special discriminatory tax."55 on banks. In this regard,
Macey and Miller suggest that banks in poor areas may indeed bear the real
brunt of eRA compliance. The requirement that banks lend 'locally'
translates into poorer neighborhoods being serviced almost exclusively by
the banks located in those communities. There is even the possibility that
this mandate makes these local institutions the only source of available
credit in poor neighborhoods. Because banks must lend in areas contiguous
to their offices, banks located in declining neighborhoods are somewhat
overburdened.56
Third, to the extent that the eRA imposes lending "targets," economic
analysis views the statute as posing a threat to the "safety and soundness"
of banks.57 The argument is that banks should not be required to sacrifice
profitability for lending opportunities. In this regard, the low loan-todeposit ratios in certain communities reflect the reality that banks have not
met all profitable local credit needs.58
According to economic analysis, much-needed diversification in asset
portfolios also undercuts the argument that a bank should make loans to a
community that are unprofitable. The bank's overall economic welfare
requires consideration not only of the quality of the bank's investment
strategies, but also of portfolio diversification. The eRA discourages such
lending diversification. Again, there is a negative impact on banks located
in poor neighborhoods, because the eRA severely limits their opportunity
to generate profitable assets through diversified lending. 59
Economic analysis of the eRA views the statute as laudable,60 but its
implementation as poor because of the government's intervention. The
argument posits that the eRA is unnecessary because the private market
can correct the information deficiencies that hamper this particular type of
55 Macey & Miller, supra note 10, at 312.
See id. at 314-15.
See id. at 320.
58 See id. at 319-20. However, Macey and Miller contend that "despite the
occasional profitable CRA loan, the general effect of the CRA is to reduce
depository institution safety and soundness" because "the existence of a few
profitable loans will not make CRA activities as a whole profitable if other loans
tum out to be unprofitable." ld. at 320.
59 See id. at 324. Although I have not focused on these issues, Macey and Miller
also discuss compliance costs and harm to low-income urban areas as indications
ofCRA's ineffectiveness. See id. at 324-33,340-41.
60 See id. at 294.
56
57
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lending and can also allocate it fairly to those within low- and moderateincome communities that are deserving of credit.61 As inherently diametric
as economic analysis is to fair lending theory, some arguments raised under
this theory merit scrutiny, even if paired with different altematives.62

3. Fair Lending Theory
The most recent challenge to banks' discriminatory lending practices
has been in the area of fair lending. The Department of Justice ("DOl")
stunned the banking community with its charges against the Chevy Chase
Savings Bank and its focus on disparate impact in lending.63 Using civil
rights laws and theory, the DOJ argued that the savings bank was engaging
in red-lining or discriminatory practices in violation of both the Fair
Housing Act ("FHA")64 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA,,).6s
The specific allegation was that the bank's marketing strategy was
discriminatory.66 The DOJ argued that the disparate impact resulted from
61 Macey and Miller do concede, however, that "[t]here is undoubtedly truth to
the argument that profitable loan opportunities exist in low-income and moderateincome neighborhoods, and that some of these loans would not be made if it were
not for the CRA." Id. at 319.
62 In a specific response to Macey and Miller's criticisms of the misallocation
of credit and compliance burdens on banks, Peter P. Swire argues for a "safe
harbor" granting automatic favorable approval to banks that have successful
records of CRA performance. See Peter P. Swire, Safo Harbors and a Proposal to
Improve the Community Reinvestment Act, 79 VA. L. REv. 349 (1993). In order to
qualify for this safe harbor, banks would have to commit substantial investments
to community development banks and other qualifying investments. The benefits
of this approach would include decreased compliance costs while increasing the
amount actually spent investing in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. See
id. at 349-50.
63 See David E. Teitelbaum, Developments in Fair Lending and Community
Reinvestment, 50 Bus. LAW. 1023, 1034 (1995). The DOJ sought to enjoin Chevy
Chase Federal Savings Bank and B.F. Saul Mortgage Company from engaging in
discriminatory lending practices. See id.
64 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1994).
6S 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1994); see also Craig E. Marcus, Note, Beyond the
Boundaries of the Community Reinvestment Act and the Fair Lending Laws:
Developing a Market-Based Framework for Generating Low- and ModerateIncome Lending, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 710, 749-50 (1996) (arguing that the DOJ
lacked authority to enforce the CRA under the FHA and the ECOA).
66 The DOJ alleged that Chevy Chase had a corporate policy that resulted in no
solicitation in the minority communities of Washington, D.C., hired few African-
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the financial institution's failure to address the needs oflow- and moderateincome persons, thus making less credit available for these groupS.67
Commentary critical of the DOJ's approach distinguishes the CRA
from fair lending. The distinctions properly point out that the protected
class is different in the two statutes: the former addresses community
concerns, while the latter addresses individual discriminatory concerns.68
Unlike the CRA, the FHA requires stringent proof and also imposes
monetary sanctions.69
The rather recent DOI enforcement developments have outpaced legal
scholarship in this area. However, before the recent enforcement action,
Overby proposed a similar approach, arguing that the CRA is another fair
lending statute. 70 Specifically, she posits that the legislative intent of the
CRA, as disclosed in its legislative history, is identical to that of the
ECOA. The ECOA prohibits discrimination in lending on the basis of
"race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age.'>1i
Overby argues that the CRA's theory ofequality comes from its prohibition
of any discriminatory lending acts, such as red-lining. 72
American loan originators, and implemented a commission structure for loan
originators that disproportionately and adversely affected residents of minority
neighborhoods. See Teitelbaum, supra note 63, at 1035. Chevy Chase offered
information to rebut the DOJ' s claims and indicated that its willingness to settle the
lawsuit was motivated by a desire to end any negative publicity resulting from the
lawsuit. See Michael B. Mierzewski & Richard L. Jacobs, What Hath Justice
Department Wrought Through Chevy Chase?, 14 No.3 BANKING POL 'y REp. 8, 11
(Feb. 1995); Teitelbaum, supra note 63, at 1034.
67 The DOJ sought injunctive relief, including requiring the bank to invest
eleven million dollars in "African American census tracts in D.C. and suburban
Maryland." Mierzewski & Jacobs, supra note 66, at 10.
68 Compare the CRA, 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (1994) (requiring financial institutions
"to demonstrate that their deposit facilities serve the convenience and needs of the
communities"), with the FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (making it unlawful "to deny a
loan or other fmancial assistance to a person ").
69 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (allowing imposition of punitive damages for
violation of FHA).
70 See Overby, supra note 3, at 1438 (arguing that "equality of access and
equality of opportunity should be the guidingjustifications for assessing the proper
scope of intervention through the CRA").
71 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (1994).
72 See Overby, supra note 3, at 1497-98. Senator Proximire, a proponent of the
CRA, said:
[F]or more than 2 years the Banking Committee has been studying the
problem of redlining and the disinvestment by banks and savings
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As a fair lending statute, the ECOA prohibits discriminatory actions in
all phases ofthe credit decisionmaking process; loan processing, including
intake, underwriting, closing terms, and conditions; sales in the secondary
market; and possibly foreclosure. Overby suggests evaluating CRA
compliance by monitoring the bank's outreach efforts to low- and
moderate-income communities.73 Banks would be required to seek lending
opportunities in low- and moderate-income communities. They would not
be required to lend in such communities unless the loans would be
profitable.74 This efforts-orientated approach clashes with the new CRA's
emphasis on performance standards.7s
Overby's approach is limited to providing equality of credit access by
focusing on procedure.76 It balances concerns with targeted CRA lending
against the misinformation issues that affect credit availability in low- and
moderate-income communities. Concentrating only on the bank's efforts
puts more focus clearly on whether the lending satisfies safety and
soundness concerns lending might impose.77
This approach allows institutions to evade the CRA when acting with
good intentions. Given all the criticism of the CRA, it is tempting to limit
enforcement to an efforts assessment. Discrimination theory in the CRA
context differs from traditional fair lending theory in that it does not focus
on discrimination against a particular individuaI.78 Fair lending in this
situation looks towards uncovering bias in the institution's approach to
institutions in older urban communities. By redlining let me make it clear
what I am talking about. I am talking about the fact that banks and savings
and loans will take their deposits from a community . . . and they will
actually or figuratively draw a red line on a map around the areas of their
city, sometimes in the inner city, sometimes in the older neighborhoods,
sometimes ethnic and sometimes black, but often encompassing a great area
of their neighborhood.
123 CONGo REc. 17,630 (1977).
73 See Overby, supra note 3, at 1518.
74 See id. at 1519.
7S See infra text accompanying note 94.
76 Overby'S analysis includes consideration of the meaning of equality as it
relates to a borrower's access and opportunity and as it relates to the role of
community groups. See Overby, supra note 3, at 1506-18.
77 See id. at 1518-19.
78 See generally Stephen M. Dane, Eliminating the Labyrinth: A Proposal to
Simplify Federal Mortgage Lending Discrimination Laws, 26 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 527 (1993) (discussing the ineffectiveness of the various statutes aimed
at prohibiting discrimination against individuals).
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providing credit access to low- and moderate-income groups. This focus
isolates the discriminatory practice on the basis of a socio-geographic
perspective rather than on the basis of race. But the legal theory finds no
support without the requisite empirical evidence.
Against this legal and policy backdrop, the discussion turns to the
recently amended statute and CRA regulations.

ill. '!HE CDBFIA: AN OVERVIEW
The obligation to comply with the CRA is imposed at the bank
subsidiary level. In regularly scheduled annual examinations, it is the
responsibility of each bank subsidiary within a bank holding company to
show that it is meeting the credit needs of the community it serves. The
brief discussion that follows describes the tests that serve as a basis for the
evaluation of CRA performance under the recently released standards.

A. The New eRA. Regulations
CRA reform resulted in new regulations that measure CRA compliance by using one of four available tests.79 The revised rules change the
focus from the bank's recorded efforts to its actual lending performance.80 The regulations allow the institution to elect its standard of
evaluation and vary depending on the size of the institution. The
performance-based test8l is the default standard. It is used for large retail
institutions82 and those that do not elect to be evaluated under a different
standard. The community development test83 applies to ''wholesale''84 or
79 The regulatory agencies released the CRA Final Rule ("Final Rule") on April
17, 1995. See 12 C.F.R pt 228 (1997). The Final Rule embodies revisions ofCRA
proposals made in 1993 in response to new sections of the CRA added in the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA"), see
58 Fed. Reg. 67,466 (1993) ("CRA !"), and also embodies proposed rules
published October 7, 1994, see 59 Fed. Reg. 51,232 (1994) ("CRA 11").
80 The new focus evaluates how an agency actually performs its services in lowand moderate-income areas, rather than how well they document their activities in
those areas.
81 See 12 C.F.R § 228.21(a)(I) (1997).
82 Basically, a large retail institution is one that does not meet the definition of
a "wholesale," "limited purpose," or "small" institution. See id. § 228.12.
83 See id. §§ 228.21(a)(2), 228.25.
84 The regulation defmes a wholesale bank as an institution that "is not in the
business of extending home mortgage, small business, small farm, or consumer
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"limited purpose"85 institutions. The small institution test allows banks of
a certain size to opt for an abbreviated examination. 86 Finally, the strategic
plan test allows an institution to develop its own compliance method,
which the examining regulatory agency must approve. 87 Regardless of the
standard that the reviewing agency uses, the possible ratings are
"outstanding," "satisfactory," "needs to improve" or "substantial noncompliance."88
Certain definitions are critical in assessing the bank's CRA actions.
The bank's "geography" describes the location of the institution or bankrelated activity.89 The geographic dispersion of a bank's loans is a major
factor in determining its CRA rating. The broader the dispersion, the less
likely regulators are to conclude that there are unmet credit needs in the
geographic community.
The bank's "assessment area" consists of its geographic locality for
CRA performance evaluation.90 It must include the area in which the bank
has its main office, branch locations, and ATMs, as well as areas where the
loans to retail customers." Id. § 228.12(w). The community development test is
available to institutions that request designation as a limited purpose or wholesale
bank. See id. § 228.21(a)(2). Once designated, the bank retains that special status
until it is changed by the bank or until one year after the regulator chooses to
revoke that status. See id. § 228.25(b). The test can examine the bank's community
development lending, qualified investments, or community development services.
See id. § 228.25(a).
85 A limited purpose institution is one that provides "a narrow product line ..
. to a regional or broader market." Id. § 228.12(0).
86 A small bank is an institution with total assets of less than $250 million that
is either independently owned or is affiliated with a holding company that has total
assets ofless than $1 billion. See id. § 228.12(t). The small institution test focuses
exclusively on lending performance by eliminating the data collection and
reporting requirements. The assessment evaluates five criteria: (I) the loan-todeposit ratios; (2) the percentage oflending activity within the bank's assessment
area; (3) the income distribution of borrowing individuals; (4) the geographic
distribution oflending activities; and (5) the asset size distribution of business and
farm borrowers. See id. § 228.26(a).
87 See id. § 228.21(a)(4).
88 Id. § 228.28.
89 Geography is defined as "a census tract or a block numbering area delineated
by the United States Bureau of the Census in the most recent decennial census." Id.
§ 228.12(1).
90 See id. § 228.12(c).
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bank has a significant number of home mortgages, small business loans, or
farm loans, and, at the option of the institution, consumer loans.91
The "loan location" describes the geographic placement ofthe loan.92 The
type ofloan determines this placement. A consumer loan is in the geography
where the consumer resides, a home mortgage loan where the underlying
property is, and a small business or farm loan where the main business facility
or farm is found. 93
Of the four standards, two - the performance-based standard and the
strategic option plan - are most likely to be used by large retail banks. The
discussion turns now to how these tests assess CRA compliance.
1. The Performance-Based Standard

Under the final rule, a performance-based evaluation system replaces the
twelve assessment factors previously used to evaluate the CRA performance
offinancialinstitutions. A large retail bank receives individual scores on three
separate tests. Those tests are:
(a) Lending Test - The bank's direct and indirect lending is evaluated,
including home mortgage, small business and farm, and community
development and consumer 10ans;94
(b) Investment Test - The bank's "qualified investments,'>9S which
include investments or grants that principally benefit or address affordable
housing or community economic development needs not being met by the
private market, are evaluated;96
(c) Service Test - The bank's systems for delivery of retail banking and
community economic development services are evaluated.97
91 This revised defmition of the assessment area, fonnerly known as the bank's
service area, is beneficial to banks because it allows them to delineate the area
based upon their market activity, or where the bank actually does business. See id.
§ 228.41(c)(2). The regulation specifically prohibits gerrymandering. See id. §
228.42. The defmition of the assessment area was a subject of much debate. CRA
I proposed that the bank be required to include some low- and moderate-income
geographies in its service area. See 58 Fed. Reg. 67,484 (1993). CRA II proposed
that the assessment area include geographies located equidistant from a branch or
ATM and its other geographies, even if no business is conducted within those
locales. See 59 Fed. Reg. 51,256 (1994).
92 See 12 C.F.R. § 228.12(p) (1997).
93 See id.
94 See id. § 228.22(a).
9S Qualified investment is defined as "a lawful investment, deposit, membership
share, or grant that has as its primary purpose community development." ld. §
228. 12(s).
96 See id. § 228.24(a).
97 See id.
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Each of the three tests has separate performance indicators that are
measured within a performance context.98 The compliance rating for each
test is defined by ambiguous, non-numerical standards.99

a. Lending Test
The lending test evaluates the bank's lending performance. Although
the test focuses primarily on direct lending activity, a bank may also
request that the regulatory agency evaluate its indirect lending through its
investments in loan pools, lending consortia, mid subsidiaries. loo The
lending test also evaluates the bank's lending practices to determine
whether they are innovative and flexible. 101
The test separately measures the bank's volume and dispersion of
community development lending102 and covered loans. 103 The regulatory
The perfonnance context evaluates the following factors:
I) [d]emographic data on median income levels, distribution of household
income, nature of housing stock, housing costs, and other relevant data ..
. ; 2) lending, investment, and service opportunities in the bank's
assessment area(s) ... ; 3) [t]he bank's product offerings and business
strategy ... ; 4) [i]nstitutional capacity and constraints, including the size
and fmancial condition of the bank, the economic climate (national,
regional, and local), safety and soundness limitations, and [other factors] .
. . ; 5) [t]he bank's past perfonnance and the perfonnance of similarly
situated lenders; [and] 6) [t]he bank's public file.
ld. § 228.21(b).
99 The possible ratings are "Outstanding," "High Satisfactory," "Low
Satisfactory," "Needs to Improve," and "Substantial Noncompliance." ld. §
228.28(a).
100 See id. § 228.22(a), (d).
10\ See id. § 228.22(b)(5).
102 A community development loan is defmed as "a loan that has as its primary
purpose community development," generally, and has not been reported by the
institution or an affiliate under another loan category (except as a multi-family
dwelling loan), and "[b]enefits the bank's assessment area(s) ora broader statewide
or regional area that includes the bank's assessment area(s)." ld. § 228.12(i).
"Community development" is defmed as "(I) Affordable housing ... for low- or
moderate-income individuals; (2) Community services targeted to low- or
moderate-income individuals; (3) Activities that promote economic development
by financing [small] businesses or [small] farms ... ; or (4) Activities that
revitalize or stabilize low- or moderate-income geographies." ld. § 228.12(h).
103 Covered loans include "the bank's home mortgage, small business, small
farm, and consumer loans ... in the bank's assessment area." ld. § 228.22(b)(1).
98
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agency evaluates an institution's lending activities using five performance
indicators. Those factors include lending activity, geographic distribution,
borrower characteristics, community development lending, and the
innovativeness and flexibility of the bank's lending practices. 104
The revised regulations allow the examining agency to consider other
loan data that the institution chooses to provide. For example, a bank may
request that its consumer lending activity be examined, if the bank has
collected and maintained the appropriate data. lOS An institution may submit
for review data on loans outstanding, commitments and letters of credit,
and community development loans originated or purchased by a consortia
in which the institution participates or by third parties in which the
institution has invested. 106

b. Investment Test
The investment test evaluates whether the bank's lending has resulted
in a benefit to its designated assessment area. 107 After identifying the dollar
amount of the institution's qualified investments, which is independent of
the institution's capital, the innovation and complexity ofthose investments
104 More specifically, the indicators discern: (1) the number and amount of the
institution's covered loans in the institution's assessment area; (2) the geographic
distribution of covered loans based on the loan location, including the proportion
of the institution's lending in the assessment area, the disbursement of lending
throughout the assessment area, and the number and amount of loans in low-,
moderate-, middle-, and upper-income geographies in the institution's assessment
area; (3) the distribution of covered loans, particularly in the institution's
assessment area, based on borrower characteristics; (4) the institution's community
development lending, including the number and amount of community
development loans and their complexity and innovativeness; and (5) the
institution's use of "innovative or flexible lending practices in a safe and sound
manner to address the credit needs of low- or moderate-income individuals or
geographies." Id. § 228.22(b).
lOS See id. §§ 228.22(a)(1), 228.42(c)(1).
106 See id. § 228.22(a)(2), (3). The institution may also elect to have the
regulatory agency review lending by the institution's affiliates. See id. § 228.22(c).
Likewise, under both the investment test and the service test, if the bank so elects,
the Board can review a qualified investment made by the affiliate of the bank, if the
qualified investment is not claimed by any other institution. See id. §§ 228.23(c),
228.24(c).
107 Contributions made to help promote community development include
investments, deposits, membership shares, and grants. See id. § 228.12(s).
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is considered. lOS The qualified investments are then considered in connection with the community's credit needs and the institution's responsiveness
to those needs. 109
c. Service Test
The service test evaluates the institution's performance of community
development services. 110 The test has two parts, the actual delivery of retail
banking services to the public and the resourcefulness of that delivery.lll
In assessing the actual delivery of banking services, the regulatory
agency focuses on the physical location of the institution and the range of
services in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. ll2 Specifically, the

108

See id. § 228.23(e)(2).

This test evaluates the degree to which lending relieves a deficiency in the
community's unmet credit needs. The four criteria are: "(1) [t]he dollar amount of
qualified investments; (2) [t]he innovativeness or complexity of qualified
investments; (3) [t]he responsiveness of qualified investments to credit and
community development needs; and (4) [t]he degree to which the qualified
investments are not routinely provided by private investors." ld. § 228.23(e).
110 "Community development services" are defmed as those services that have
a "primary purpose [of] community development" and are "related to the provision
offmancial services." ld. § 228.120). Qualifying community development services
include "lending executives to organizations facilitating affordable housing
construction and rehabilitation or development of affordable housing; providing
credit counseling, home maintenance counseling, and/or fmancial planning to·
promote community development and affordable housing; and low-cost or free
government check cashing." David E. Teitelbaum & John M. Casanova,
109

Regulatory Refonn or Retread? The Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 51
Bus. LAW. 831, 836 (1996). These community development services "must benefit
a bank's assessment area(s) or a broader statewide or regional area that includes the
bank's assessment area(s)." 12 C.F.R. § 228.24(b).
111 See 12 C.F.R. § 228.24(a).
112 The regulatory agency evaluates the bank's availability and effectiveness in
delivering retail services by considering:
(1) [t]he current distribution of the bank's branches among low-,
moderate-, middle-, and upper-income geographies; (2) ... [t]he bank's
record of opening and closing branches ... ; (3) [t]he availability and
effectiveness of alternate systems for delivering retail banking services •..
in low- and moderate-income geographies and to low- and
moderate-income individuals; and (4) [t]he range of services provided in
low-, moderate-, middle-, and upper-income geographies and the degree to
which the services are tailored to meet the needs of those geographies.
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focus is on the institution's record of branch openings and closings, its
range of services, and its provision of alternative service options, such as
ATMs and computer or telephone services. ll3
In addition to the test outlined above, the new regulations also changed
the information that banks that are part of a holding company must report
regarding their CRA small business lending. Previously, all institutions
reported annually to the appropriate regulatory agency their total business
lending. That report required identification of the dollar volume and size
of all outstanding business loans. Under the revised regulations, certain
institutions must also make available data about the size and the geographic
location of their small business loans. 114 The requirement does not extend
to all banks because it was determined that only certain institutions
engaged primarily in small business lending. I IS As will be discussed below,
this revision is not extensive enough to determine small businesses' access
to capital. 116
A large retail bank is not limited to the performance test· as an
assessment of its CRA strategy. It has the option of using the strategic
business plan test, which is described below.

2. The Strategic Business Plan Test
The strategic business plan test is available to any institution that elects
to submit an individual compliance plan to the regulatory agency. It is the
most innovative of the reform measures because it allows the bank to
develop its own compliance plan with annual, measurable goalS.117 The
institution also establishes or defines satisfactory performance under the
plan. I IS The safeguard for banks that choose this option is that if they fail
under the plan, they may be evaluated under the lending, investment, and
service plan tests. 119
The strategic business plan test requires more initiative on the part of
the bank and more involvement on the part ofthe community that it serves.
ld. § 228.24(d).
113 See id.
114 "Small business loan" is defined as "a loan included in 'loans to small
businesses' as defmed in the instructions for preparation ofthe Consolidated Report
of Condition and Income." 12 C.F.R. § 228.12(u).
115 See id. § 228. 11 (c)(3).
116 See discussion infra at Section V.
117 See 12 C.F.R. § 25.27(c)(1), (t)(1).
118 See id. § 25.27(t)(3).
119 See id. § 25.27(t)(4).
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In order to develop a strategic plan, a bank must (1) conduct informal
meetings with the community to identify credit needs;120 (2) establish
specific, measurable goals;121 (3) solicit formal comments from the public on the plan; 122 and (4) receive approval from the Office ofthe Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC").I23 Although the OCC may approve the
plan, the institution is also subject to the regulatory agency's interpretation. 124
The strategic option plan offers the greatest amount of control and
independence in the CRA regulatory process. It may not result in the
anticipated innovation in community development lending, however,
because it fails to reward banks for taking the risks associated with
innovative lending. The plan's short implementation time frame, mandatory public disclosure, and lack of specific guidance are all disincentives
for institutions to attempt a CRA strategic option plan. 125
The CRA regulations give the bank subsidiary partial discretion in the
evaluative method used and complete discretion in choosing how to carry
out the obligation. The institution has much less control over how the
examiner will evaluate its choice. The next section discusses some of the
schemes available to banks setting up CRA compliance programs.
B. Community Development Financing
Various existing entities engage in community development financing.
The community development bank network provides low- and moderateincome communities with access to capital through a combination of
federal funding and private investments. 126 This section ofthe Article gives
a concise explanation of the recent legislative initiatives designed to
facilitate credit access by economically distressed communities.
See id. § 25.27(d)(I).
See id. § 25.27(c)(I).
122 See id. § 25.27(d)(2).
123 See id. § 25.27(a)(2).
124 See id. §§ 25.27(a)(2) (requiring acc approval), 228.27(a)(2) (requiring
approval by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ("Board")).
125 See id. §§ 25.27(c) (limiting the term of the plan to no more than five years),
25.27(d) (requiring "public participation in plan development), 25.27(f)(i) (leaving
the banks to specify its goals).
126 See Jeffrey S. Lesk & Richard M. Price, An Introduction to the Community
Development Bank Network, 4 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L.
267,267 (1995).
120

121
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1. Financial Institutions

a. Community Development Financial Institutions
The CDBFIA encouraged the operation of community development
financial institutions ("CDFls") by creating the Community Development
Financial Institutions Fund ("Fund") to finance their operation. 127 A
fmancial institution must be designated as a CDFI in order to receive
money from the Fund. The Fund provides financial assistance through
grants, loans, equity investments, deposits, and acquisition of credit union
shares. 128
A CDFI is a specialized bank whose primary mission is to promote
community development by eliminating poverty and meeting community
credit needs. 129 CDFIs exist in four basic forms. The two most common,
minority-owned banks and community development banks ("CDBs"), are
usually depository institutions that are federally insured and regulated. 130
A third form ofCDFI is a community development credit union ("CDCU").
Although CDCUs are regulated financial cooperatives, they are owned and
operated by low-income persons to meet check-cashing, deposit, and
127 See

12U.S.C. §4701 (1994). Congress passed legislation appropriating $391
million to support CDFIs over a four-year period. See also id. § 4702 (1994); Lesk
& Price, supra note 126, at 268-69. The Fund is a wholly owned government
corporation, managed by an Administrator and overseen by a fifteen-member
advisory board composed of nine citizens, the Secretaries of Agriculture,
Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, and Treasury, and the
Administrator of the Small Business Administration. See 12 U.S.C. § 4703(a)(2),
(b)(1), (d)(2) (1994). The statute limits the total amount that any institution may
receive to no more than $5 million for any three-year period. See id. § 4707(d)(1).
An exception to the funding limitation is allowed for the establishment by the CDFI
of certain subsidiaries or affiliates to serve a "targeted population" or an
"investment area" in another state or metropolitan area not currently served by the
institution. See id. § 4707(d)(2).
128 See Lesk & Price, supra note 126, at 269
129 See Richard D. Marsico, Fighting Poverty Through Community

Empowerment and Economic Development: The Role of the Community
Reinvestment and Home Mortgage Disclosure Acts, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
281,282 (1995).
130 A CDB operates specifically to provide capital to rebuild lower-income
communities and commonly is a subsidiary of a bank holding company. See Taibi,
supra note 9, at 1523.
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consumer loans needs. 131 The fourth type of CDFI is a community
development loan fund, an ''uirregulated and uninsured financial
intermediar[y]" that pools capital and contributions from banks, investors,
and foundations to provide equity, bridge loans, or below-market financing
to promote the development of affordable housing and the revitalization of
retail stores or other small businesses in distressed communities. 132
Designation as a CDFI requires that an organization meet certain
prerequisites. The institution must identify its primary mission as community development and either have an identifiable investment area or serve
a targeted population. 133 In addition to fmancial services, a CDFI must also
provide development services in conjunction with loan or equity investments and maintain community accountability through community
representation on its governing board. The statute specifically prohibits a
CDFI from having a government affiliation. 134
A CDB readily meets the defmition of a CDFI. A CDB is a private
commercial bank that actively engages in community development
lending. 13s Its organizational structure may include nonbank subsidiaries
See id. at 1523-25.
See id. at 1525.
133 See 12 U.S.C. § 4702(5) (1994). "Investment area" is defmed as an area that
"meets objective criteria of economic distress." Id. § 4702(16). "Targeted
population" is defmed as "individuals, or an identifiable group of ... low income
persons." Id. § 4702(20).
134 See id. § 4702(5).
135 See Taibi, supra note 9, at 1522. A community development bank ("COB")
is the most comprehensive of the CDF! models, because of its ability to utilize
funds from affiliates to develop the community. See id. In 1993, President Clinton
introduced a proposal to create 100 COBs. The President proposed that these banks
should be modeled after existing similar successful banks, particularly Shorebank
of Chicago, a bank holding company. See Paul Wiseman, Chicago BankRedefines
Role in Community, USA TODAY, Jan. 8, 1993, at lB. The President's proposal was
not made blindly. During his governorship in Arkansas, President Clinton solicited
the help of Shorebank in establishing a rural development bank - the successful
Southern Development Bancorporation. See Lesk & Price, supra note 126, at 267.
Shorebank's subsidiaries offer community and economic development programs,
such as affordable housing programs, a real estate company focused solely on
economic development, and fmancing for small businesses through the Minority
Enterprise Small Business Investment Corporation. See id. Backed by unlimited
access to capital, and with the help of South Shore Bank, an affiliate of Shorebank,
Shorebank has helped rehabilitate over 8000 apartment units. See Wiseman, supra,
at lB. South Shorebank's nonperfonnance loan rate is under 2%, 1.5% less than
the financial industry's average. See Lesk & Price, supra note 126, at 268;
131

132
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but because the entire enterprise is engaged in community development
lending, it qualifies as a CDFI. 136 The advantage ofthe CDB organizational
form is that as a federally insured financial institution, the bank has
unlimited access to capital and credibility as a lender within the community.!37
A bank holding company can qualify as a CDFI only if the holding
company and all of its subsidiaries and affiliates satisfy the requirements
of a community development financial institution. 138 Since most banks do
not qualify for such a designation, the alternative for most banks is for the
financial institution or its holding company to become a "community
partner" by providing loans, equity investments, or development services
to the relevant investment area or targeted population. 139
An institution becomes a CDFI by filing a Comprehensive Strategic
Plan ("CSP").140 The CSP is a five-year business plan that identifies
community needs and describes how the financial institution will meet
those needs. The CSP requires an integrated approach: the CDFI's goals
must be consistent with other applicable economic, community, and
housing development plans. 141
Investment in a CDFI provides a safe harbor for bank holding
companies and state-chartered Federal Reserve Banks. Equity investments
in a CDFI are permitted without Federal Reserve approval within certain
limitations. 142 The contributions may amount to an aggregate of five
Wiseman, supra, at lB.
136 See 12 U.S.C. § 4702(5)(A) (1994). Citibank is one of the many banks that
have taken advantage of the new regulations concerning CDBs. It will receive
community lending credit for its investment in a non-profit CDFI in Chicago that
lends to home buyers and small businesses in distressed communities. See Gwen
A. Ashton, Developments in Banking Law: 1996, 16 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 1,3
(1997).
137 A financial institution that makes equity investments in a CDFI may receive
credit against deposit insurance assessments. See The Bank Enterprise Act of 1991,
12 U.S.C. § 1834a(a)(3) (1994); Lesk & Price, supra note 126, at 271.
138 See 12 U.S.C. § 4702(5)(B)(i).
139 See id. § 4702(6); Lesk & Price, supra note 126, at 270.
140 See 12 U.S.C. § 4704(b)(2)(D).
141 The CDFI Fund reviews the applications of the institutions and evaluates
them according to the statutory criteria: likelihood of success, need for equity
investments, loans, extent of economic success, and geographic diversity. See id.
§ 4706(a). The statute also imposes reporting requirements and sanctions for
violations of performance goals. See id. § 4707(f)(1)(B), (2)(c).
142 See Lesk & Price, supra note 126, at 272.
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percent of a bank's capital stock and surplus; individual investments must
not exceed two percent of the bank's capital stock and surplUS. 143 The
holding company investment is similarly limited to five percent of the
company's consolidated capital stock and surplUS. I44
Most financial institutions will find the CDFI organizational structure
too limiting. The entity of choice for most bank holding companies is,
therefore, the community development corporation, which is discussed
below.

b. Bank-Affiliated Community Development Corporations
Even before the passage ofthe CDBFIA, bank holding companies were
allowed to operate nonbanking subsidiaries engaged in economic development activities. 145 The CDBFIA did not affect the organization of these
entities: they may qualify as a community partner under the statute. A CDB
allows a bank holding company to make an equity contribution that might
qualify as satisfying part of the investment test under the CRA
regulations. 146
Unlike a CDFI, a community development corporation ("CDC") is not
a financial intermediary. It is a venture development organization designed
to promote and revitalize community development. 147 A CDC owned by a
bank holding company is under the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve. 148
When the Federal Reserve initially approved CDCs as a permissible
affiliate operation, its policy goal was to encourage community partnerships between the public and private sectors. The regulations allow equity
investments in CDCs or other qualifying ventures 149 as a way to supplement
the bank holding company's nonequity participation in community
See id.
144 See id.
145 See Richard D. Marisco, Fighting Poverty Through Community Empowerment and Economic Development: The Role ofthe Community Reinvestment and
Home Mortgage Disclosure Acts, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 281 n.140 (1995).
146 12 C.F.R. § 228.23 (1997). Under the investment test, a bank's qualified
143

investments may include investments in credit unions or grants that principally
benefit or address affordable housing or other community economic needs not
being met by the private market.
147 See Brian Glick & Matthew J. Rossman, Neighborhood Legal Services as

House Counsel to Community-BasedEfforts to Achieve EconomicJustice: TheEast
Brooklyn Experience, 23 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 105, 109 (1997).
148 See 12 C.F.R. § 228.11(a).
149 See id. § 228.24(a).
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development. ISO The objective is to minimize losses to the banking
enterprise should the riskier community development lending turn out to
be unprofitable.
As with other nonbanking subsidiary activities, the regulatory agency
ensures that the CDC's operations are consistent with the safety and
soundness concerns related to holding company operations. lSI Additionally,
any nonbanking affiliate of the holding company must meet a public
benefits test in order to receive Federal Reserve approval for operation
under Regulation y. IS2
Like all nonbank affiliates, a bank-affiliated CDC must meet a public
purpose test for authorization. This test requires that the nonbank affiliate
not engage in activities that unfairly compete with existing financial
institutions. ls3
The Federal Reserve Board has approved various activities that satisfy
the community development requirement, including providing temporary
equity investments in small- or medium-sized businesses in economically
depressed areas. lS4
CDCs may operate for profit and may transfer those profits to the
holding company. ISS The Federal Reserve does not limit the holding
company's use of those profits.
Similar to CDCs, holding company ownership of a community
development lending subsidiary also allows bank subsidiaries to participate
in nonbanking activities in which their participation as lenders would
ISO See Kenneth P. Fain & Sandra F. Braunstein, Bank Holding Company
Investments for Community Development, 77 FED. RESERVE BULL. 388, 389
(1991).
151 Ali regulator of holding companies, the Federal Reserve monitors the
activities of nonbanking subsidiaries for safety and soundness. See 12 U.S.C. §
1841 (1994).
152 See 12 C.F.R. § 225.24(a).
153 See id. Regulation Y, which defmes the nonbanking activities that bank
holding companies may engage in, defmes community development as "[mlaking
equity and debt investments in corporations or projects designed primarily to
promote community welfare, such as the economic rehabilitation and development
of low-income areas by providing housing, services, or jobs for residents." Id. §
225.28(b)(12)(i). These are essentially pre-approved activities in which a bankaffiliated CDC can participate.
IS4SeePAULINEB.HELLER,FEDERALBANKHOLDINGCOMPANYLAW§5.01[6]
(1997).
ISS See Fain & Braunstein, supra note 150, at 390.
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otherwise be forbidden. 156 A bank-affiliated CDC may make, directly or
indirectly, equity or debt investments in projects that satisfy the community
welfare requirement. 157
A CDC may operate in all the geographic markets that bank subsidiaries serve. Under the current Federal Reserve regulations, a bank holding
company has some discretion in meeting the disparate needs of economically distressed communities. 158 Operating as a nonbanking subsidiary
requires that the CDC promote the community welfare. 159 Community
development lending, as defined by the Federal Reserve, directs that the
CDC's lending activities be "designed primarily to promote community
welfare."160 Commonly permitted activities include "providing housing,
services, or jobs for residents" oflow- and moderate-income areas. 161
In the CDBFIA, Congress determined that the community development
business lending initiatives also should include incentives for more
involvement on the state level as well as in the secondary market. What
follows is a brief description of two such proposals.

c. Other Initiatives Facilitating Credit Access
i. The Small Business Capital Enhancement Program
The CDBFIA also established an initiative, called the Small Business
Capital Enhancement Program ("SBCEP"), that is administered by state
governments and designed to encourage commercial lending. 162 The
See generally 12 C.F.R. § 225.25.
See id. § 225.24(a).
158 See id. § 225.25(b)(6).
159 See id.
160 Fain & Braunstein, supra note 150, at 139. "[T]he Federal Reserve does
examine all community development proposals to determine whether the planned
investment meets the 'community welfare test,' whether the size of the investment
is appropriate to its purpose and prudent for the institution, and whether there is
community involvement in the project or organization supported by the
investment." Id. The Federal Reserve's defmition explicitly exempts from the
defmition of community development "investments to build or rehabilitate upperincome housing or to develop any facilities not explicitly designed to create
improved job opportunities for lower-income persons are presumed not to benefit
the public welfare." Id.
161 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(6).
162 See 12 U.S.C. § 4741 (1994).
156

157
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SBCEP helps small businesses access debt capital from commercial
lending institutions by establishing a state loan loss reserve. 163
The Fund contributes money to a state-designated small business
capital access fund. The SBCEP requires that the designated state agency
identify and enter into a formal agreement with commercial lenders
experienced in the financial and managerial aspects of small business
lending. 164 If a lender charges off a small business loan loss, the institution
is eligible for reimbursement from the reserve fund. 165 By reducing the
possibility of loss from poor loan performance, fmancial institutions in
a particular state are encouraged to view small business lending as less
risky.
ii. Small Business Loan Securities

The CDBFIA encourages the securitization of small business loans by
easing the registration and disclosure requirements. 166 The CDBFIA
amendments allow banks to securitize commercial loans to the same extent
as residential mortgages. 167 The effect of the legislation is to increase
lending capacity and possibly decrease the cost of small business
lending. 168
Before the passage of the CDBFIA, commercial loans were subject to
registration requirements under the federal securities laws. 169 Those
requirements made the process of securitizing small business loans quite
costly. By eliminating the prerequisites to securitization, Congress intended
163 States participating in the SBCEP must designate a state agency to
implement the program. The CDFI Fund will make $50 million available for
reimbursement See id. § 4743(b)(1); Lesk & Price, supra note 126, at 271. This
program requires CDFI Fund approval and matching funds from the state of one
dollar for every two state residents. See 12 U.S.C. § 4743(b)(3).
164 "Each state must establish a separate reserve fund for each participating"
lender. Lesk & Price, supra note 126, at 271; see 12 U.S.C. § 4745(b). The state
must deposit into that reserve fund premium charges for three to seven percent of
each covered loan. See id. § 4745(h)(1).
165 See 12 U.S.C. § 4745(k)(1).
166 The Small Business Loan Securitization and Secondary Market
Enhancement Act of 1994, 15 U.S.C. § 682(a) (1958 & Supp. 1997).
167 See David S. Neill & John P. Danforth, Bank Merger Impact on Small
Business Services Is Changing, 15 No.8 BANKING POL'y REp. 1, 17 (1996).
168 See id.
169 See The Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l (1994).
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to expand small business funding into the broader capital markets, rather
than limiting it to banks. 170
.
The development of a secondary market should result in more small
business lending. A concomitant result would be more bank participation
in small business loan origination. Banks would be able to originate more
small business loans, without having to hold onto them. l7l
While the CDBFIA provides more options for banks performing
community development lending, it is not the fully integrated approach that
is needed. Before discussing how the federal small business loan programs
can fuse with CRA-required lending, I shall identify some of the weaknesses in the legislation.
IV. EVALUATING THE CDBFIA's FINANCING SCHEME
CDFIs promote community development by defining goals and
objectives that match the community's development needs with the
necessary fmancial resources. Congress funded CDBFls in order to make
more credit available to economically distressed communities. 172 However,
the conclusion that such institutions provide better community development lending than traditional fmancial institutions may be unfounded.
While the stated goal is to stimulate economic development in undeserved
communities, its limited funding may hamper that goal.
While CDFls may obtain some federal financing, they must raise
additional monies needed to operate. Financial institutions receive limited
CRA credit for making such an investment. 173 CDFls must explore and
secure financing from private financing sources in order to ensure
continuous operation and successful funding of development projects.
Small CDFls will especially suffer as they extend their resources to address
management and funding needs.
170 See Christopher Beshouri & Peter Nigro, Securitization ofSmall Business
Loans, ECONOMIC & POLICY ANALYSIS WORKING PAPER 94-8, 34 (1994) (arguing
that the legislative amendments will have the greatest effect on guaranteed small
business loans).
171 See Cynthia A. Glassman, Banks Face Serious Challenge in Preserving Key
Lending Franchise, 12 BANKING POL'y REp. No. 23, at 15 (Dec. 6, 1993). Ms.
Glassman also points out that the advantage of creating a government-sponsored
agency such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac is that there will be a fIxed-rate longterm market for the loans. However, this type of stable market might also result in
a shift of small business lending out of the banking industry.
172 See 12 U.S.C. § 4701 (1994).
173 See supra text accompanying note 101.
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The special d~signation required to become a CDFI makes CDFI status
difficult for most financial institutions. Additionally, successful commercial banks that have diversified portfolios are disinclined to limit their
holdings to the narrow investment area or targeted populations as required
for CDFI status.
CDFls have no way to reduce their risk of loss because of the lack of
diversification in their loan portfolios. Although community development
lending can be quite profitable, a varied portfolio of loans reduces the
threat to the institution's solvency in the event of an economic downturn.
Likewise, CDCs have a narrow focus. A bank-affiliated CDC may
engage in direct community development lending. However, banks have
traditionally used these entities to manage their community development
services. 174 Often, CDCs provide technical support, necessary services, or
jobs for low- and moderate-income development. They also may reduce the
search cost for qualified borrowers in a particular area. 175
A CDC's community lending may also be hampered by regulatory
funding restrictions. Bank holding companies and thrifts are limited in the
dollar amount they may allocate to a project. 176 The restriction on parent
company funding requires CDCs to become adept at fundraising. Additionally, staff resources must be taken away from core operations and devoted
to fundraising efforts.
Similarly, the OCC may prohibit banks from investing in certain CDCs
if there is a conflict of interest. A member of the board of directors from
one bank may not serve on the board of a CDC if the institution meets
certain size requirements. 177 Similar to participation in a CDFI, a bank's
investment in a CDC will reflect only marginally on its CRA rating: it will
qualify under the investment test, not the lending test. 178
174 See Michael H. Schill, Assessing the Role of Community Development
Corporations in Inner City Economic Development, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 753, 766 (1996-97).
175 CDCs can share the risk of default with the lending institution by
participating in the loan. See Overby, supra note 3, at 1450-51 (discussing banks'
past reluctance to make loans in low- and moderate-income areas due to little or
inaccurate credit risk information as well as bias); see also supra notes 2-4 and
accompanying text.
176 See discussion in text supra note 13l.
177 See Depository Management Interlock Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3203 (1994); id. §
3204 (listing the exceptions to the rule). The CDC may request a review of the
investment from the Community Development Division, which may approve the
transaction.
178 See supra notes 94-116 and accompanying text.
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CDCs often face dilemmas in amassing both the funding and the
technical expertise to meet their needs. CDCs may be unable to obtain the
necessary fmancing for projects because they lack the required experience
base to execute the project. Yet, those same organizations cannot gain
experience in developing projects because they are not able to obtain the
necessary financing. 179
Securitizing small business loans may not lead to greater credit access
for small businesses engaging in community development lending. The
largest beneficiary of this change will be the small business venture capital
firm, known as a small business investment company ("SBIC,,).180 Those
firms, structured like corporations, are licensed for operation by the SBA.181
SBICs are to provide fmancial assistance through equity capital or longterm loans. 182 However, the average SBIC will consider community
development loans too risky.183
What is needed is a secondary market for securitizing community
development loans. When lenders have more opportunities to sell these
loans in the secondary market, they will be willing to make more of them.
A government-sponsored enterprise, similar to Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae,
would make this lending more attractive to lenders and investors. Similarly,
easing the registration requirement for community development loans sold
on the secondary market, while perhaps making the requirements more
stringent for other types of lending, is another way to facilitate credit
access for this specific type of lending.
179 For example, some CDCs attempt to address the needs of the community
directly. They engage in real estate development projects such as mini-malls or
apartment buildings. Often their inability to employ staffwith sufficient technical
backgrounds as well as their inability to purchase the special equipment necessary
for real estate development are significant impediments to their success. See Schill,
supra note 174, at 774-75 .
.180 An SBIC must have combined private paid-in capital and paid-in surplus of
not less than $5 million. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 682(1)(A) (West 1997). For a
discussion of SBICs, see generally Joseph W. Bartlett, Government-Enhanced
Equity Available for Investment in Traditional Venture Capital and Buyouts: the
New SBIC Participating Securities Program, 1994 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 589.
181 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 681(c) (West 1997).
182 See 15 U.S.C. § 684(a), (b)(I) (1994).
183 This is due in part to the repeal of statutory provisions authorizing special
financing that encouraged SBICs to engage in community development lending.
Elijah Brewer III et aI., Peifonnance and Access to Government Guarantees: The
Case ofSmall Business Investment Companies, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 16,24
(Sept./Oct 1996) (fmding the performance ofbank-affiliated SBICs superior to that
of non-bank SBICs).
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Although each of the programs discussed above has a significant part
to play in broadening credit access for small businesses engaged in
community development lending, the limitations mentioned above are
significant enough to merit a critical discussion of alternatives. Focusing
on the existing small business loan guarantee programs that enhance credit
access for small business lending is one such alternative.

v.

fuSION - USING GUARANTEED, LEVERAGED

FuNDs TO PROMOTE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT LENDING
There is without question a move towards fewer, larger banks. The
concern that small businesses' access to capital will be affected by industry
consolidation is tempered by industry statistics to the contrary.184 Many
point out that the number of capital sources to which small businesses have
access is increasing. 18S Arguably, the lending practices of a consolidated
industry will harm small businesses in economically distressed communities more than small businesses not located in such communities. 186
Eventually, accompanying the compression of the industry will be less
merger activity and a dilution of the CRA because there will be no urgency
for holding companies to show the strong CRA performance that was
necessary as a condition of merger or branch approval. Given the industry
transformation, a changed perspective regarding the holding company's
direct involvement in the CRA is warranted. 187
184 See Arthur P. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Good to Be True? The Unfolfilled Promises
Behind Big Bank Mergers, 2 STAN. L.J. Bus. & FIN. 1 n.170 (1995) [hereinafter
Wilmarth, Too Good to Be True?] (noting that a study, which was confined to the

states ofIllinois, Kentucky, and Montana, concluded that small businesses seeking
loans from out-of-state bank holding companies do not have a competitive
disadvantage in lending).
185 See S. REp. No. 103-332, at 3408-09,3411 (1994).
186 The recent bank consolidation trend may impact small business lending for
at least three reasons. First, Congress removed the historical geographical
restrictions in the industry. With the passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking
and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, bank holding companies may acquire or
merge with other banks in any state without authorization. Second, banks face more
competition from nonbanks in providing services to customers. Finally, the
technological innovations in banking are costly, but necessary as consumers
demand more advanced products and services. Only profitable banks may engage
in these innovations. See generally Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 11, at
1040-44.
187 See Activists Are Challenging Bank Expansion on Much More Than CRA
Performance, supra note 5, at 7; Marion A. Cowell, Jr. & Monty D. Hagler, The
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The use of SBA funding in this era of bank consolidation might serve
as an indicator ofhow effectively small businesses are faring in their access
to capital. The presumption against interstate banking is that small
businesses suffer. To the extent that a financial institution lends outside its
local geographical area, there is concern that small businesses receive
reduced access to credit at an increased price. 188 Reviewing a bank's use of
its SBA-guaranteed loans might be useful to ensure that participation in the
program is by businesses in need of the program's benefits. Guaranteeing
accountability requires that the bank holding company be responsible for
that review.
To examine that issue, the first section below explaUls the merger rules
governing bank holding company expansion. Following that discussion, I
explain the SBA-guaranteed business loan programs designed to provide
a source of capital for small business lending. 189 Finally, in Part VI, I
recommend scrutinizing the bank subsidiary's use of and access to SBAguaranteed loans in an effort to encourage more community development
lending.
A. Regulatory Approval ofBHC Mergers and Acquisitions

There is only one sanction for failing to adequately meet the credit
needs of a community: denial of an application for expansion of a bank
holding company's deposit-taking facilities. 190 Although each regulatory
Community Reinvestment Act in the Decade of Bank Consolidation, 27 WAKE
FORESTL.REv. 83, 94-97 (1992); Jeffrey M. Lacker, Neighborhoods and Banking,
8112 FED. RESERVE BANK RICHMOND Eco. Q. 13, 31 n.34 (1995).
188 See Wilmarth, Too Good to Be True?, supra note 184, at 36 (noting that
"large banks make significantly fewer small business loans in comparison with
community banks").
189 "A 'small business' must be independently owned and operated, not
dominant in its field, and must maintain certain maximum size standards which are
subject to change." Patricia L. Brown, Selected Issues in Entity Selection for
Family Businesses, C834 ALI-ABA 1,42 (1993); see 13 C.F.R. §§ 121.101, .201,
.301 (1997). Eligibility requirements are distinct from size standards for certain
business loans and guarantees. See id. § 120.100.
190 See Julie J. Daverio, The Community Reinvestment Act: Once Again in the
Spotlight, But WillBanks, Community Groups, and the Federal Banking Regulators
EverSeeEye-to-Eye?, 15HAMLINEJ.PUB.L.&POL'Y255,259-60,276-77 (1994)
(describing the weakness ofthe statute's enforcement mechanisms as an intentional
result of Congress's concern with banks' ability to lend safely in low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods).
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agency has jurisdiction to address merger considerations, I have limited the
analysis here to the holding company context, and thus to the Federal
Reserve's responsibility.
The Federal Reserve may consider CRA performance as one factor in
an evaluation for a bank merger or acquisition. 191 Specifically, in reviewing
the holding company's application, the agency reviews the applicability of
three controlling statutes: The Bank Holding Company Act ("BHCA"),192
the Bank Merger Act ("BMA"),193 and the Change in Bank Control Act. 194
Together these Acts measure competitiveness, safety and soundness, and
convenience and needs. 195
As originally enacted, the BHCA was limited to mergers involving
holding companies. It prohibited mergers that substantially lessened
competition. The BMA made the BHCA's acquisition restrictions
applicable to all federally insured institutions. The effects test under these
two statutes applies to any line of commerce, in any section of the
country.196 In appraising the probable competitive results, the review
basically defines two relevant markets - product and geographic. Before a
direct or indirect acquisition, the appropriate regulatory agency must
consider the three effects and provide written approval ofthe transaction. 197
The statutory scheme regulates the economic development of the banking
industry by prohibiting mergers that result in sizable market shares. 198
191 See BankAmerica Corp., 78 FED. RESERVE BULL. 338, 344 (1992).
12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1994).
1931d. § 1828.
1941d. § 1817.
195 The competitiveness factor evaluates whether the proposed merger will
result in a monopoly in the relevant geographic and product markets. See id. §
192

1842(c)(l). The safety and soundness factor evaluates the capitalization, present
and future, of both the institutions and their managerial resources. See id. §
1842(c)(2). The convenience and need factor evaluates the public benefits of the
resulting merger, including a review of the acquiring institution's record ofCRA
compliance. See id. § 1842(c)(2)-(3).
196 See id. § 1842(c)(I).
197 See id. § 1842(a).
198 The most significant ruling under this statute was the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). The
Court held that section 7 of the Clayton Act governed bank mergers. See id. at 34155. The decision invalidated the Federal Reserve Board's approval of the merger
of the second and third largest banks in Philadelphia. The Court rejected the
agency's reasoning that because the bank was well-managed, the large market
concentration would not harm the area, and the convenience and needs of the city
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The easing of the geographic restrictions in banking has resulted in a
wider product and geographic market. 199 The result is a dilution of the
competitiveness factor in merger decisions. Since the competitiveness
factor has become less critical, the Federal Reserve Board's merger
analysis concentrates on an evaluation of the safety, soundness, convenience, and needs factors.2°o
When evaluating the monetary effects of a merger, the regulatory
agency assesses fiscal competence. This is the safety and soundness
evaluation. It examines the institution's lending policies and practices.
Relevant factors include finances, earnings, and management of the banks
involved.20 1
A bank's CRA lending must also be consistent with safety and
soundness concems.2°2Each institution establishes its risk for all loans, in
which CRA lending must be included. Essentially, this requires that CRAtype loans must fall within those defmed loss limitations. The regulators'
evaluation of those parameters is limited to a reasonableness review.
The convenience and needs factor takes into account a bank's CRA
performance. The regulatory agency assesses whether the acquiring bank
has implemented and maintained CRA policies and programs before filing
an application. 203 As a result, each subsidiary bank ofthe holding company
seeking merger approval needs a satisfactory CRA record of
performance.204
A change in regulatory policy amended the regulatory agency's prior
practice of allowing a bank subsidiary with an unsatisfactory record of
would be served by the larger banle See id. The Court did suggest one exception
was for institutions that were at risk offailing. See id. at 371-72 n.46.
199 In Northeast Bancorp v. Board o/Governors o/Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S.
159, 169-73, 178 (1985), the Supreme Court approved easing banking's
geographical restrictions.
200 See Cowell, & Hagler, supra note 187, at 92-93.
201 See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2).
202 See id. § 1842(d)(3).
203 See id. § 2903.
204 The appropriate federal financial supervisory agency evaluates the CRA
performance of the subsidiaries of the acquiring company. The Comptroller of the
Currency regulates national banks; the FDIC regulates state chartered banks and
savings banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System; the Federal
Reserve regulates state chartered member banks of the Federal Reserve System and
bank holding companies; the Office of Thrift Supervision regulates thrift savings
and loan companies. See id. § 2902(1)(A)-(D).
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CRA performance to make commitments for future improvements.20S
Compliance with the CRA means that all of the bank subsidiaries have
existing programs that adequately address community needs at the time that
the holding company applies for regulatory approvaP06 The bank
subsidiary must show that it does not engage in discriminatory lending and
that its lending performance addresses the credit needs ofits identified lowand moderate-income neighborhoods. 207
Satisfactory CRA performance evidences a CRA plan that functions
effectively for residential, small business, and farm lending. It also
evidences an institution that has a continuous commitment to monitoring
its own program performance.
Monitoring industry compliance with CRA in an era ofbank consolidation requires an evaluation that defmes satisfactory small business lending.
Small business borrowers have unique needs that require some flexibility
in underwriting and in assessing collateral requirements. 2os Adequate CRA
performance for small business lending requires a recognition of thqse
trade concerns as well as a loan access and review process that is responsive to their uncommon demands.209 The proposed change to the CRA and
SBA regulations attempts to meet these needs by first identifying whether
a disparity exists in meeting the credit needs of this group of borrowers.2\0
Although the new regulations require more data collection for small
business lending, they do not go far enough in ensuring that there is not a
void in the credit needs ofthis particular sector. One way ofassessing those
needs is to require reporting that shows how the bank is using SBAguaranteed lending.211

B. The SBA-Guaranteed Loan Programs
SBA loan programs assist a bank in meeting small business funding
needs. By authorizing the SBA to provide loan guarantees, Congress has.
205 Before this change, many banks were able to satisfy protectors' concerns
aboutCRA performance by negotiating with them and making future commitments
to the Federal Reserve that the bank's performance would become satisfactory. See
Cowell & Hagler, supra note 187, at 89,92,94.
206 See 12 U.S.C. § 2903.

See id.
See infra Parts V.B.1-.3.
209 See infra Part IV.
210 See infra Part VIB.
207
208

211 The proposal presented in this Article would extend the Federal Reserve's
analysis of the probable effects of the merger to include an assessment of
guaranteed small business loans. See infra Part VI.B.
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given the agency a role in creating credit access to undeserved markets.
Charged specifically with providing "business loan assistance only to
applicants for whom the desired credit is not otherwise available on
reasonable terms from non-Federal sources,"212 the agency's section 7(a)213
and 504214 loan programs are consistent with the goals of community
development lending. In this regard, the SBA can serve as an integral part
of a bank's CRA compliance program.
1. The Section 7(a) Program

Section 7(a) of the Small Business Act provides financing for general
business loans. That financing may be through either a direct loan from the
SBA,21S an immediate participation by a lender and the SBA,216 or a
guaranteed 10an.217 The guaranteed loans program, in which the SBA
insures a portion of the loans against the borrower's default, is the focus of
the proposed changes to the CRA regulatory structure.218
Under section 7(a), the business loan guaranty program, the SBA acts
as a partial guarantor ofloans from commercial lenders to small firms.2 19
SBA participation provides several advantages. Banks and other lenders are
willing to provide longer term financing than would otherwise be available.
Often, lenders are willing to make larger amounts of credit available at
lower interest rates. Neither the market nor the regulatory environment
would permit these advantages for small businesses without SBA
participation.220
13 C.F.R. § 120.101 (1997) (emphasis added).
See infra Part V.B.!.
214 See infra Part V.B.2.
21S 13 C.F.R. § 120.2(a)(i). Certain applicants who cannot obtain commercial
loans even with a government guarantee are eligible to apply for SBA direct loans.
The SBA often limits eligibility for this type of assistance to qualified businesses
with special needs, such as those owned by low-income or handicapped
individuals, certain organizations employing them, or businesses located in areas
of high unemployment. See H.R. REp. 104-873, ch. 2.2, at 28 (1996).
216 See 13 C.F.R. § 120.2(ii).
217 See id. § 120.2(a)(iii).
218 See discussion supra Part ill.
219 Ineligible purposes for these business loans include debt consolidation and
refinancing. See 13 C.F.R. § 120.130.
220 The SBA may lend up to $750,000 to an eligible borrower in SBA loans,
with terms up to 10 years. See id. § 120.211(b).
SBA loans are generally collateralized, and such collateral may consist of
212
213
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The typical government-guaranteed borrower has been in business for
less than two years, lacks sufficient collateral to properly secure the
requested credit, and does not have the necessary cash flow history. The
guarantee can serve one of two purposes. It may provide the bank with a
strong secondary source of repayment and enable the bank to grant the
loan. On the other hand, the longer term and amortization may reduce the
borrower's payment. If the purpose of the loan is to provide permanent
working capital, it can reduce the amount of the outstanding loan to an
amount that is acceptable to the lending bank.221
The private lender for the guaranteed loans programs may be either a
bank or a qualifying nonbank.222 Also, the agency may designate active,
expert lenders as certified and preferred lenders, who then qualify for
streamlined lending programs.223
The loans made with SBA guarantees are loans that would have been
declined absent the credit enhancements.224 Businesses that receive section
land, buildings, machinery and equipment, warehouse receipts from
marketable merchandise, chattel, inventory (generally not good unless used
in a bonded or otherwise acceptable warehouse). The SBA generally
requires guarantees of all principals involved in the business and requires
principals to further secure guarantees by means of collateralization of
personal assets such as second trustees on homes or other similar collateral.
Brown, supra note 189, at 42; see 13 C.F.R. § 120.160(a). The SBA guaranty
ranges from 70% to 90% of the loan amount. Business eligibility requirements are:
i) Retail- average annual sales may not exceed $5 million over the past
three years;
ii) Wholesale - average number of employees may not exceed 100 over
the last three years;
iii) Manufacturer - average number of employees may not exceed 500
over the last three years.
See id. § 120.201.
These loans have a floating interest rate that is usually two to three percentage
points above prime. The rates "reset[ ] up as market rates increase and reset[ ]
down as market rates decrease." Richard D. Marshall et al.,An Overview o/Money
Market Fund Regulation, SB23 ALI-ABA 293, 387 (1996).
221 CONSUMER AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS DEP'T, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
PHILADELPHIA, SMALL BUSINESS, BIG POSSIBILITIES 18 (Keith Rolland ed., 1995)
(referring to the activity of the Bank of Boston).
222 Small business lending companies are nondepository institutions that the
SBA licenses, supervises, examines, and regulates as a lender. See 13 C.F.R. §
120.470 (1997). The Money Store remains the largest nonbank lender of SBAguaranteed loans. See Glassman, supra note 171, at 15.
m Preferred lenders get a one-day turnaround and are permitted to submit their
own loan documents for SBA approval. See 13 C.F.R. §§ 120.450 - .455.
224 See H.R. REp. 104-873, supra note 215, at 28.
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7(a) loans generally depend upon the future earnings of a company for
repayment. Credit analysis does not depend upon the soundness of each
transaction or the short-term viability of the business, but on the likelihood
that a loan can be repaid from the borrower's stream of earnings over a
term of several years.22S
The newness of the business is the focus of the section 7(a) program.
This factor is particularly appropriate when dealing with community
development businesses.
Although these businesses initially may need technical assistance in
developing a realistic business plan, often they perform sufficiently well to
seek additional credit to undergo expansion. The expansion of existing
businesses is the focus of the SBA's section 504 lending program, which
is explained below.

2. The Section 504 Program
The section 504 program funds loans to small fIrms for plant acquisition, construction, conversion, expansion, or equipment.226 There is also a
stringent job creation requirement that results in a boost in economic
development within a community.227
The SBA guarantees a ten- or twenty-year debenture issued by a
certifIed development company.228 The proceeds from the sale of the
debentures are used to fund the loan. 229 The SBA portion of the loan may
fund not more than forty percent of the project. The conventional lender,
usually a local bank, must provide fIfty percent fInancing with a similar
long-term commitment to the borrower.23o The borrower generally provides
the remaining ten percent.
The program allows a bank to provide expansion capital to small
businesses that might not qualifY under conventional fInancing terms due
to tight cash flow, insufficient collateral, or under-capitalization. Small
businesses require extended amortization to meet the cash flow involved
in large capital expenditures. Although this extended repayment period
creates a maturity risk, the SBA guarantee minimizes the risk by creating
a collateral cushion for participating banks.231
See 13 C.F.R. § 120.150.
See id. § 120.882.
227 H.R. REp. 104-873, supra note 215, at 235.
228 See 13 C.F.R. § 120.933.
229 See id. § 120.801(d).
230 See id. § 120.801.
231 The SBA guarantee requires banks to fmance only 50% of the total asset
costs while obtaining first priority on the asset. See id. § 120.801(c)-(d).
225

226
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The program is attractive to banks because the SBA and the certified
development company agree to take a secondary position on all of the
collateral pledged, leaving the bank heavily over-collateralized, in the event
of default. Moreover, the borrower receives the benefit of a long-term,
fixed-rate loan with an interest rate established by the SBA with the
Secretary of the Treasury's approval.232 Certificates representing a pool of
section 504 debentures are sold monthly to investors in the private capital
markets.233
A further advantage of using SBA-guaranteed loans is that the loans
can be sold in the secondary market. The next section describes the benefits
of securitizing SBA-guaranteed loans and lays the foundation for the
argument that more focused SBA lending will provide long-term fmancing
for community development lending while also reducing the risk inherent
in such loans.

3. The Secondary Market for SBA-Guaranteed Loans
Traditionally, small business loans have been difficult to securitize
because they do not provide uniform borrower characteristics. Banks have
viewed the inability to assess creditworthiness and to monitor the
performance of small business as an impediment to lending.234 Additionally, small businesses tend to have non-traditional assets that cannot be
pledged as security and insignificant cash flow in the early years of
existence.23s
An active secondary market for small business lending has developed,
encouraging investors who want to fund this industry while reducing their
own credit risk. Holders of the securities receive monthly payments of
principal and interest based on the pool ofloans.236
232 See id. § 120.932.
233 See id. § 120.801(d).
See Beshouri & Nigro, supra note 170, at 5.
See id. at 4.
236 The market for small business securities has developed because the government guarantee provides protection against credit risk. See id. at 34. A small
business security represents beneficial ownership of a fractional undivided interest
in a fixed pool of small business loans. The holder of a certificate is entitled to a
pro rata share of all interest on the loans and all payments or other recoveries of
principal. Correspondingly, any losses realized from defaults on the underlying
loans are shared by the investors pro rata. See id. at 19. The process of issuing
small business securities begins with the accumulation of a pool ofloans that meets
rating agency and investor criteria as to such factors as loan size, credit quality, and
234

23S
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Generally, commercial banks gather the pools of SBA-guaranteed
loans.237 The securities operate in a manner similar to mortgage or assetbacked securities.238 As pass-through securities, the SBA-guaranteed loans
are traded in the minimally regulated government market and are exempt
from registration under the securities laws. 239
Leveraging SBA-guaranteed loans presents several positive regulatory
options for a bank. 240 Securitizing the loans allows the bank to maintain its
desired liquidity level of assets.241 The loans also are eligible as collateral
for Federal Reserve Bank advances242 and improve regulatory capital
ratios.243 In effect, the SBA-guaranteed loan yields profits and benefits
equivalent to or better than a conventional loan.
Profitability in the small business market is predicated on four factors:
''the ability to streamline origination and servicing costs, analyze and
geographic dispersion. Those criteria include evaluating the loans to detennine
tenns of payment, principal, interest, prepayments, and secondary market trading.
SBA pools are comprised solely of government-supported loans that are less than
one year old at the time the pool is fonned. The pool of loans may have denomination, maturity, and risk characteristics that are identical to or different from those
of the underlying loans. See id. at 34. "The securities amortize fully over maturities
of 20 to 25 years, but may be called for redemption due to prepayment or default
with respect to all loans or guaranteed portions comprising the underlying SBA
pool." Marshall et al., supra note 220, at 287.
237 "The Securities consist of certificates issued by the SBA' s fiscal and transfer
agent based upon pools of SBA guaranteed loans (or portions thereof) assembled
by the Broker as an approved pool assembler." Marshall et aI., supra note 220, at
387; see 13 C.F.R § 120.600. "The average size of the' SBA loan pool backing a
particular SBA certificate is $ 2 million to $ 10 million." Marshall et aI., supra note
220, at 387. "SBA regulations govern the maximum acceptable difference between
lowest and highest interest rates with respect to individual guaranteed loans or
portions comprising a particular pool as well as the maximum acceptable difference
between maturity dates of such loans or guaranteed portions." Id.; see 13 C.F.R §
120.611.
238 See Marshall et aI., supra note 220, at 387.
239 See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1994).
240 See id. § 684(c).
24\ The CDBFIA allows banks to use Generally Accepted Accounting
Procedures in booking the sale ofloans subject to partial recourse provisions. This
accounting convention then reflects the recourse provisions of the "securitization
as a means of credit enhancement." Neill & Danforth, supra note 167, at 17.
242 A loan participation allows a bank to make a loan beyond the regulatory set
limit. See 12 C.F.R. § 935.9 (1997).
243 See id. § 567.6.
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correct excessive portfolio risk, and leverage the profitability of the
business deposit relationship, including the personal relationship of the
business owner."244 By securitizing its small business loans, a bank creates
a tangible loan supply surplus. In turn, its losses are protected by the SBA
guarantees.
Large retail banks have some flexibility in their use ofSBA-guaranteed
loans. Specifically, the banks can use the loans as either credit enhancers or in loan participation. Using the SBA loan guarantees as credit
enhancers allows the banks to close the credit gap. The SBA participates
as a lender by providing credit to cover the amount of the unfunded
loan commitment. That unfunded obligation represents the amount that
the bank has decided is either too risky to lend or that exceeds its lending
limit.
Large retail banks arguably misdirect their use of the SBA programs.
It is advantageous for the bank to use the SBA loan funds as leverage for
those loans for which performance is unpredictable. The bank reduces its
risk ofloss by making the loan under the SBA-guaranteed program. Some
banks make tremendous profits by selling those loans on the secondary
market. Regulations that require banks to direct SBA-guaranteed lending
to those businesses truly in need ofthe government guarantee would result
in a more resourceful use of the federal loan funds. One way to achieve
this goal is to give the bank holding company a more defined CRA
obligation for its SBA loan portfolio. This means that when the holding
company requests regulatory authority to merge or expand, there is a
focused objective regarding its small business, community development
lending.
Specifically, CRA ought to mandate that the holding company take an
active role in developing policies and procedures that will result in
effective monitoring ofthe community development small business lending
throughout its operations. This requirement would make the holding
company responsible for overseeing its bank subsidiaries' use of SBAguaranteed loans. The geographical dispersion and amount of lending in
this particular portfolio would assist the SBA in determining whether
lenders using the program's funds are meeting the program's objectives.
Simply put, banks oughtto use the SBA-guaranteedfunds in a manner that
promotes fair lending for small businesses outside of the mainstream of
credit access.

244

SMALL BUSINESS, BIG POSSIBILITIES, supra note 221, at 14-15.
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VI. SYNERGY: DEFINING THE
BANK HOLDING COMPANY'S RESPONSIBILITY

A bank holding company should bear direct responsibility for its small
business, community development lending. This obligation is needed at the
holding company level for several reasons. First, it compels the parent
company to make an integrated assessment of how its banking subsidiaries
are addressing the credit needs of small businesses involved in community
development. Second, it provides more incentive for the parent company
to create enterprise-wide fmancing vehicles for community development
lending. Finally, it segregates this specialized area of government loans
from conventional loans, forcing a different type of risk analysis.245
This focus is an appropriate one given the SBA's mandate offacilitating capital access to small businesses. SBA's chief concern is making
credit available to small businesses that are unable to get conventional
financing elsewhere, due in part to the location of the business. To the
extent that the CDBFIA is concerned with credit access and alternative
supplies of credit to specific groups and organizations, SBA lending has
some of the same policy objectives.
To achieve this objective, the SBA's business loan program's
definition of qualifying small business should be congruent with the CRA
definition of community development lending. This requirement would
result in a financial institution's participation in the SBA's programs in
ways that facilitate feasible community development lending. More
importantly, lenders would not be able to make lending decisions that result
in geographical disinvestment.
SBA lending comes within the jurisdiction of the fair lending laws.246
The absence, however, of a systematic means of evaluating lenders'
discretion in making these decisions creates a void against which no
assessments can be made. Because banks initiate these loans, the SBA is
unable to determine how lenders are making decisions. The instant
245 See Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 11, at 1038-40 nn.382-94 (discussing the special needs of small businesses and the effect of industry
consolidation on banks' abilities to service those needs). Although holding
companies will complain that the request for more information is more costly, the
need for strengthened compliance and the accompanying procedures must be
balanced against that cost, with the public's interest as an integral part of that
equation.
246 See supra notes 63-78 and accompanying text.
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proposal provides a means for making bank lenders more accountable and
fair in their small business lending and for providing SBA with access to
that data.
This proposal has two parts - part one addresses the CRA reforms and
part two addresses the SBA reforms needed for congruent implementation
of the program. 247

A. Evaluating the Needs ofSmall Businesses:

eRA Reform

If a bank subsidiary is subject to the data reporting requirements for
small businesses,248 its holding company must submit a separate CRA plan
for small business lending. That plan must show how the holding company
facilitates credit access throughout holding company operations. In
particular, each bank subsidiary must identify its participation in the SBA
§§ 7(a) and 504 loan guarantee programs. In effect, this creates a distinct
finding under the lending and investment tests for community development
small business lending under the CRA.249
Under the proposal, when the Federal Reserve makes its assessment of
the acquiring institution's CRA performance, it would evaluate the amount
of credit extended through SBA-guaranteed loans. Current regulations
require reporting the dollar amount and the geographic location of those
10ans.250 The regulations should be amended to require that the bank
subsidiary identify specifically which SBA-guaranteed loans were made in
fulfillment of the bank's CRA commitment; the bank also should be
required to identify the amount or percentage ofSBA-guaranteed loans that
the bank sold in the secondary market. For those SBA-guaranteed loans for
which the bank is claiming CRA credit, the bank must include a specific
reference as to how the loan assists in community economic development
as defined in the CDBFIA. Finally, in addition to the existing requirement
identifying why conventional financing was not used,2S1 every small
business loan that is an SBA-guaranteed loan should supply supporting data
on its current percentage of SBA loans.
Equally as important, the small business lending data should include
information regarding rejected loans. All small business loans in the bank's
assessment area should be available for review to determine whether there

See supra Part IV.
See supra Part ill.A.
249 See supra notes 94-116 and accompanying text.
250 See discussion in text at supra note 114.
251 See 13 C.F.R. § 120.101 (1997).

247

248
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is discrimination in the credit process. It is possible that lenders are
engaging in racial red-lining of small business loans.252 Each community
development business loan should carry a certification signed by the
borrower stating that the lender orally discussed the eligibility of SBAguaranteed loan funds for financing the loan. Each loan should also include
the lender's statement describing why the loan is ineligible for SBAguaranteed loan funds. Only ifthere is a record available ofthe consistency
of the underwriting standards, the terms and conditions of loans granted,
and information regarding the servicing of these loans is there a basis for
making determinations about the fairness of the lender's process, as well
as the fairness of the lender's substantive decision.
An effective SBA-guaranteed lending program implies fair lending
criteria. Fair lending in the eRA context means equitable opportunities for
access to federally guaranteed loans, regardless of the geographic location
of the business. As a consequence of fair lending prohibitions, the subtle
biases inherent in geographic disinvestment should be reduced. However,
because procedure alone may not be a sufficient deterrent, this proposal
calls for SBA lending criteria to address geographic disinvestment as
well.2S3
As a guide for a holding company developing a eRA compliance
program under this proposed obligation, four policy approaches are
representative of the uncommon needs of small businesses that facilitate
community development. The selected areas are particularly vulnerable to
practices of unfair, subjective lending. Policies that define the parameters
for bank subsidiary lenders would ameliorate the unnecessarily harsh
results at that level and provide those lenders at least with a mechanism to
make a less biased review.
The four selected areas are as follows: Appropriate borrower identification, underwriting standards, credit scoring, and rejection review.

1. Appropriate Borrower Identification
A holding company implementing the eRA should want to project the
strong perception that it is committed to fair lending. To that extent, it is in
the enterprise's best interest to search for, or scout out, creditworthy
252 The term "racial redlining generally refers to the practice of denying loans,
based on the racial characteristic of the residents of an area." Jeanine Catalano,
Important Links Exist Between Fair Lending Laws and the eRA, 14 BANKING
POL'yREp. No.3, at 25 (Feb. 6-20,1995).
253 See infra Part VI.B.
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community development borrowers through community outreach and
education programs. Finding the borrower that needs an SBA-guaranteed
loan is dictated by the location of the banking subsidiary. The bank's
assessment area, defining the geographical boundaries of the community
that it serves, becomes the basis for its CRA marketing strategy. Although
the average borrower might not be able to detect who the group targeted to
receive SBA-guaranteed loans should be, it is imperative that the holding
company develop guidelines for identifying eligible entities.
At the holding company level, directors want to ensure that the
marketing strategy reflects their small business customer base. An intensive
identification of the needs ofthe small businesses in the bank's geographic
locale may be required. CRA compliance requires responsive evaluative
techniques and assessments of the community development businesses'
traditional and nontraditional needs. A bank subsidiary will be more likely
to make this type of resource commitment if it has clear signals that the
holding company is also invested in the process.
CDCs can have a significant and appropriate role to play in this
process. CDCs tend to have unique abilities in identifying businesses and
organizations that effectively service the community's needs. In this
regard, CDCs serve as effective advocates and identifiers of community
needs. They facilitate the lending process to the extent that they provide the
lender with additional sources of information that assist in determining
creditworthiness.

2. Underwriting Standards
One aspect of the obligation at the holding company level involves
creating a secondary market for community development loans. A
successful market for community development lending requires flexible,
unique underwriting standards.254 These standards require methods of
assessing material information regarding future business performance and
potential loan performance for this specialized type of lending. 255 •
Lenders tend to be less knowledgeable about low- and moderateincome communities. This ignorance can be costly. It requires that the
lender spend more funds to gather information about these communities.
Using a cost-benefit analysis, these lenders often decide not to make that
254 See Lento, supra note 9, at 783-97 (describing the lending programs at South
Shore Bank and Elkhorn Bank and Trust Company).
255 See id. at 789.
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investment.256 Those that do are learning as they lend. Until concentrated
resources are devoted to training the people responsible for making these
loans, the underwriter cannot identify the scope of the risk.
Developing the knowledge base is also critical to closing the credit gap
on these loans. Although the SBA guarantee is available for up to ninety
percent ofthe value of the loan, nothing restricts the bank from making the
loan with a smaller guarantee. Again the bank holding company should
have policies designed to ferret out abuses of the guarantee. To the extent
that banks participating in the loan programs request more funds than are
actually needed, there is less money available for other small businesses to
receive.
Requiring the holding company to develop uniform underwriting
standards provides much-needed support for the bank personnel that are
engaged in finding and reviewing community development lending on a
daily basis. Knowing what the holding company's parameters are allows
these personnel to review proposals with some creativity and flexibility, as
well as with confidence.
Finally, the holding company could require that upon qualification, its
bank subsidiaries become certified andlor preferred SBA lenders. Lenders
who receive this certification receive expedited SBA review, reducing the
turnaround time for customers.2S7
3. Credit Scoring

Streamlining credit approval is facilitated by credit scoring. Credit
scoring is a statistical technique for determining a borrower's ability to
repay the loan. It first evaluates uniform borrower characteristics. Then,
identifiers are analyzed by comparing them to historical data on repayment
pattems.258 Credit scoring facilitates securitization. A bank with SBAguaranteed loans creates its own capital market and therefore obtains lowcost funds by transferring ownership of its accounts receivables or other
rights to payment.
Credit scoring is a way of making small business loans uniform. An
advantage of credit scoring is that it allows banks to generate a high
volume of small business loan originations. These loans are made without
256 See Susan Wachter, Discrimination in Financial Services: What Do We
Know?, 11 J. FIN. SERVICES REs. 205, 207 (1997).
257 See 7 C.F.R. § 4279.43 (1997).
258 See Neill & Danforth, supra note 167, at 14.
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particular regard to the geographical location of the loan. 259 Large banks
can absorb the cost of purchasing the technology that both streamlines its
credit approval process and lowers the cost of credit to customers.260
While credit scoring facilitates lending in the secondary markets,261 it
also allows lenders to use more objective criteria in a way that disadvantages a small business with little credit history. Just like individuals, some
businesses lack a credit history and may need to have ways of proving
creditworthiness other than proof of credit history. The holding company
needs to be sensitive to this dilemma by, for example, establishing options
of other forms of repayment history. For example, the ability of the
principal individual borrower, instead of just the business, to repay might
be relevant. Again, the holding company's establishment of the standard
gives the subsidiary bank the opportunity to act with clarity and consistency.

4. Rejection Review
Lending to community development businesses with an SBA guarantee
changes the profile of qualified borrowers. Small business owners who
might otherwise be unable to obtain financing because of a perceived risk
are acceptable to a lender if a guarantee is provided. Lenders, who
otherwise have unarticulated reasons for disapproving these loans, have an
incentive to view them more favorably.
To ensure that the guarantee loan program is maximized as a source of
community development lending, the holding company ought to become
the final arbiter on whether a guaranteed loan is accepted or rejected. A
formal review process for evaluation of all rejected community development loans should be established at the holding company level.
259 See id. at 14, 18 (arguing that the SBA's adoption of standardized,
nationwide credit scoring methodology lends credence to the assessment that small
business lending is national, not local).
260 "Although small business credit scoring practices had their start at larger
banks and fmance companies, a commercially viable technology became available
in 1995 to institutions of all sizes." ld. at 15. Additionally, the regulatory agencies
might consider absorbing some of the cost of this proposal by helping to develop
the necessary technology and selling it to banks at a lower cost.
261 A by-product of the development of the pass-through securities mortgage
market has been a standardization of mortgage loan documentation. "The
securitization procedure was developed by the government mortgage insurance
companies and now accounts for between 50 to 80 percent of all securitizations."
ld. at 17.
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Reviewing rejected loan applications also provides a means for
ensuring uniformity in making SBA-guaranteed lending. One possibility is
to create a small business lending group made up of member banks. Each
bank would bring a predetermined number of problematic community
development lending applications to regularly scheduled meetings for
review. Additionally, any application that a member bank rejects would
automatically be reviewed by this central loan committee.262 This process
allows a uniform assessment of why applications are denied. Its denial
review process ought to be publicized so that rejected applicants are aware
that any rejected loans will be reviewed in this conclusive manner.
In limited circumstances, business loans made outside ofan assessment
area ought to receive eRA credit by the bank subsidiary making the
loans. 263 When the bank's reason for rejecting the loan can be identified as
the bank's inability to service the particular type ofloan, then an approving
sister bank subsidiary ought to be allowed to receive eRA credit for it. In
such a situation, the holding company should actively monitor the hank
subsidiary that rejected the loan to determine ifit needs additional technical
or fmancing assistance in order to perform community development
lending at an adequate level.
If the locus of responsibility for eRA small business loans moves from
the bank subsidiary to the holding company, demonstrable efforts for
system-wide assessment will be possible. The congruency needed -for
uniform assessment and review demands changes in the SBA as well.

B. Easing the Friction: SEA Reform
Current SBA regulations do not mandate, for program compliance
review, information on the geographic distribution ofthose loans. The SBA
needs information that will allow it to confirm that banks are using the
lending to facilitate credit access. Specifically, the SBA needs to collect
262 This model draws heavily from the Delaware Valley Mortgage Plan
("DVMP"), which was established before the enactment of the CRA among local
banks in the Philadelphia area.
263 This proposal does not extend as far as Klauser's tradable CRA obligations,
see Michael Klausner, Market Failure and Community Investment: A MarketOriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1561,
1580 (1995), but does recognize and try to address market inefficiencies in a very
limited fashion. Assuming that the performing bank subsidiary becomes successful
in integrating the information into a price system, the advantage to this particular
exception is that since performance is IVonitored by the parent company, the
performing bank has more incentive to share information. See id. at 1586.
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more data to ensure that banks are not using SBA loans to contribute to
geographic disinvestment.264
The SBA must require data that allows the agency to undertake a more
systematic review of its small business lending. This data will assist the
SBA in its own review of the actual placement of its lending to determine
ifbanks are using the funding only when credit enhancement is warranted.
More can be done. The SBA ought to target community development
lending as appropriate, although not exclusive, recipients ofthe section 7(a)
and section 504 loan programs. Community development loans under the
revised CRA regulations include loans that have as their primary purpose
promoting economic development, such as financing small businesses and
furnishing community services to low- and moderate-income persons.26S
The SBA's mission to facilitate credit availability and capital access for
small businesses is fulfilled when businesses that qualify for community
development loans receive access to these monies. Although the SBA has
several specialized programs, none ofthem specifically address community
development lending.266 Essentially, this means that the SBA ought to make
loan funds available to banks that are channeling the funds to businesses
that truly are not able to get credit elsewhere. Similar to its preferred or
certified lender programs, the SBA could establish a preferred lender
program for community development lenders.267
Such a program aclmowledges the resourcefulness oflenders who are
trying to comply with SBA guidelines and are funneling those funds
properly. It would also help expose those banks that are misusing the
guaranteed loan program by participating in it primarily to gain the benefits
264 Limited infonnation is currently available that supports this point
Specifically, the SBA § 504 loan program in Chicago allegedly made "most of its
loans to companies in higher income neighborhoods." Joseph Pena, "Feeble" Bank

Lending Crimps South Dallas Development of$62 Million in SBA Loans in Dallas
County, Only $5 Million Went to Businesses South ofthe Trinity, DALLAS Bus. J.,
Sept. 12, 1997, at 24. Additionally, a study of SBA loans in the Dallas area
uncovered misuse of SBA loan funds by lenders as well. See id.
265 See supra notes 94-116.
266 The SBA's specialized programs have focused on providing more access to
minority- and women-owned businesses. See Thomas Jefferson Hasty, ill,Minority

Business Enterprise Development and the Small Business Administration's 8(A)
Program: Past, Present, and (Is There a) Future?, 145 MIL. L. REv. 1 (1994)
(critiquing the SBA's minority business development programs and suggesting
needed refonns to make the program more effective).
267 See 13 C.F.R. §§ 120.440-.442 (1997) (Certified Lenders Program),
120.450-.455 (preferred Lenders Program).
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ofthe profitable secondary market. Many banks that do high-volume SBAguaranteed lending are lending to borrowers who are able to get credit
elsewhere.268
Under the current regulations, the SBA makes no separate inquiry
about credit availability to the borrower. Instead, the agency relies on the
lender's certification that without an SBA loan, the borrower would be
denied credit elsewhere on reasonable terms and conditions.269 Although
the lender must have documentation on me to substantiate the borrower's
eligibility based on the unavailability of credit elsewhere, the lender's
submission of the application to the SBA constitutes certification to that
effect. The SBA must develop a more rigorous means to eliminate
inappropriate borrowers as identified by lenders.
The above-suggested changes to the CRA will act as a deterrent for
lenders who might abuse the certification process. Moreover, if the SBA
defines community development lending as a specialized type of lending
within its small business loan program, a lender's certification would have
a different focus. SBA-guaranteed lending for community development
loans would highlight the agency's purpose in making the funds available.
Defining community development lending in SBA regulations would
assure consistent application of the criteria nationwide. As a consequence,
businesses that have made a financial and geographical commitment to
maintain their commercial operations in economically distressed communities are recognized and served.
If the SBA adopts the CRA definition of community development
lending, the location of the business becomes important. By evaluating
factors such as the business's possibility of expansion, the number of
people in the firm, the geographical location of the firm, and the financial
condition of the employees,270 the SBA can establish whether the bank is
lending to an economically disadvantaged community and determine the
degree of diminished credit opportunities that it might encounter because
of its location.
Finally, a more substantial change in SBA lending might well be
warranted. There are certainly risks inherent in lending to small businesses

268
269

See Pena, supra note 264, at 24.
See 13 C.F.R. § 120.10l.

270 For a discussion about the need for an adequate work force as a significant
decision in business location decisions, see Mildred Wigfall Robinson,

Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities under the Omnibus Budget and
Reconciliation Act of1993: A Promising Concept with Some Modifications, 11 J.
L. & POL. 345, 352 (1995).
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located in economically distressed communities.27I The SBA benefits if its
lenders are well versed in and understand the risk parameters of small
business lending. Those lenders ought to be recognized and given priority
access to program funds.
The SBA ought to establish a pilot program that specifically makes
more guaranteed loan funds available to successful SBA bank lenders.272
A revolving fund consisting ofSBA-guaranteed securitized loans would be
available solely for community development lending. This initiative would
reserve some SBA loan funding annually for institutions that do substantial
amounts of community development lending. 273 By making the nonguaranteed portions of loans available cyclically as they are sold off into
the secondary market, SBA could actually dedicate a pool of money
specifically for community development lending. This program should be
limited to banks.274
This supply ofcapital reserved for SBA-guaranteed lending would also
facilitate the recommended change in eRA compliance at the holding
company level. By establishing a defined market for community development lending with SBA programs, parent companies have an incentive to
participate in these programs in an appropriate way. The concomitant result
would be to develop and sustain another source of capital for small
business community development lending. 275
These proposed changes to the SBA and the eRA address concerns
raised by all sectors involved with eRA: community development
businesses, community organizations, financial institutions, and the
regulatory agencies. As a way to revitalize the economic infrastructure of
communities, using SBA funds allows banks to participate in eRA lending
with an accessible supply of credit; that lowers the riskiness, actual or
perceived, that accompanies eRA business lending.
See id. at 371.
The regulations authorize the SBA to initiate pilot programs to implement
SBA program objectives and goals. See 13 C.F.R. § 120.3 (1997).
273 Although community development lending has more rigorous documentation
requirements, it could have flexible registration requirements to make the loans
more attractive to investors, thereby specifically enhancing the market for these
types ofloans.
274 Nonbank lenders would be ineligible to participate in this particular program
since it is designed to facilitate CRA lending and they have no CRA obligation.
275 Although these funds would be set aside for CRA lending, if there are no
available projects that are eligible, the funds should be made available to SBA
lenders generally.
271

272
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The recommended changes address some of the concerns of market
theorists. Although SBA funds are available to nonbank lenders, it is
crucial that the SBA reserve some funds for bank lenders doing community
development lending. Because other financial intermediaries do not have
a eRA obligation, it seems fair to allow banks to have some priority over
SBA funds in order to comply with eRA regulations and to do what some
might argue is a governmental function. To the extent that eRA is
perceived as encouraging risky or inefficient loan performance, this
proposal encourages banks to use SBA lending for the necessary equity
cushion to make that lending less demanding.
The market's inability to service certain communities may mean that
there is imperfect information affecting the pricing structure. To the extent
that imperfect information is based on discriminatory practices, the market
cannot automatically make the necessary corrections. Yet the proposal
correlates with fair lending theory. By making the holding company
responsible for eRA small business lending, it tries to uncover the biases
that may occur in this particularly local sector lending. It is important
that there is a focus on each subsidiary institution's performance and
not just on its efforts. This is most effective with direct bank holding
company responsibility. Without a wholesale transferral of a fair lending approach into eRA, the banking regulators need to have a concrete
means of assessing the effects of industry consolidation on this particular
sector.
Finally, community empowerment theory recognizes that businesses
and financial institutions are critical links in developing economically
sustainable communities. This proposal does not address the type of
structural changes that the community empowerment model presents.
When viewing financial institutions as distributing credit and resources
within a community, communities should not be denied access to the
deposit funds. The eRA gives community organizers scant more power
than the limited power to temporarily halt tlle expansion of a financial
institution into a new geographic market. The interests of community
organizers in low- and moderate-income communities would be well
served by having access to capital protected uniformly. The proposal
continues the call for federal involvement in uncovering the subtle biases
affecting lending decisions in low- and moderate-income communities. The
change, although incremental, is much needed to monitor and improve the
capital access to community development business.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The existing SBA regulatory scheme fosters an approach which allows
a private mechanism, lenders, to make public policy decisions about the
socio-economic character of communities. Implicit in the CRA and its
reforms are a recognition of the complex interdependence among policy
objectives. The reform statute specifically recognizes that geographical
disinvestment has an equally deleterious effect on small business lending
as it does on residential mortgage lending. In small business lending,
however, fair lending laws provide a limited mechanism for ensuring that
SBA-guaranteedloans are used properly. A proper use for SBA-guaranteed
loans is revitalizing economically distressed communities. Given this
premise, lenders' decisions about access to SBA-guaranteed loans becomes
an issue of credit access that must be addressed systemically.
While CRA reform has expanded the statute's focus to the actual
performance ofcommunity development lending and provided more means
for financing community development loans, it fails to recognize in a
concrete way the special needs of small business lending in these communities. The proposal outlined in this Article would effectively combine the
interests of small businesses, community organizations, financial institutions, and regulatory agencies to revitalize the economic infrastructure of
communities.
The absence of a congruent and integrated approach to capital access
for economically distressed communities grants lenders too much
exclusivity regarding guaranteed loan funds. The era of federal funding
retrenchment makes acute the need for community businesses to have
access to capital. Community development business loans provide muchneeded jobs and incrementally help stabilize economically distressed
communities. Therefore, they must be properly distinguished as specialized
lending because of their integral part in this economic revitalization. A
CRA program that combines safe and sound lending with SBA-guaranteed
loans can effectively fuse public policy goals.
Since the guarantee portions of these loans are fully insured, there is
little risk of loss to a financial institution that uses these loans for CRAtype lending. It is possible that a community development loan will not
qualify as an SBA-guaranteed loan. Those that do qualify may not meet the
requisites for securitization. When SBA-guaranteed loans can be
securitized, however, they create more than a credit enhancement for
participating banks. Aggressive use of these two programs - SBAguaranteed lending and securitization of small business loans - where
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possible, makes the SBA a partner in fulfilling the federal government's
public policy goal of ensuring that financial institutions make credit
available to the entire community.
Reconsidering the goals of the SBA might be a way to ensure that the
underlying policy objectives, as well as those of the CRA, are met.
Specifically, by mandating and reviewing holding company-level
responsibilities while also offering incentives that encourage participation,
lenders' CRA performance and community development lending might
become both stronger and more visible.

